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ABSTRACT
MARX'S CONCEPT OF LABOR
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Directed by: Professor Jean B. Elshtain
This work examines Habermas' claim that Marx's theory is
latently obj ectivistic due to a restrictive, instrumental
understanding of the concept of labor. In this
interpretation, Marx's work is a form of positivism and
scientistic in epistemological orientation. a related claim
is that as a result of the above Marx's theory lacks a
normative foundation adequate to support its claim of
critique. An even further expansion of the claim, which
makes clear its political dimension, is that this series of
misconceptions on Marx's part lie at the root of the
subsequent development of a technocratic variety of social
theory embodied in the bureaucratic centralist Countries of
Eastern Europe.
Ultimately, Habermas' work entails a fundamental
misunderstanding of Marx's critique of capitalism and the
v
structure of Marx's thought. it is this failure to
understand adequately the structure of Marx's theory that
makes possible Habermas
• reading of Marx. This work argues
that Marx's theory is doubly bisected, first by the
distinction between appearance and reality, and second, by a
distinction between the metatheoretical and historical
levels of analysis.
In conclusion, it is argued that although Habermas'
interpretation of Marx is inadequate, both Marx and Habermas
share a project that invites subjects to conceive of social
relations free of the distortions of power, deception and
self-deception on Habermas' part, and exploitation and
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CHAPTER I
HABERMAS' ANALYSIS OF MARX
Introduction
Negative Dialectics Theodor Adorno remarks that
material reality can not be subsumed by categories of
thought without leaving a "remainder." He states further
that "The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with,
than that objects do not go into their concepts without
leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the
traditional norms of adequacy ... It indicates the untruth
of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust
the thing conceived."^ In a similar fashion, Marx's work
has never fit well into the categorical containers
constructed to house it by political theorists, social
philosophers, and intellectual historians.
This work scrutinizes a claim, one that in different
forms has reappeared consistently in the secondary
literature on Marx. Most recently this claim has been
^ (1973) , p. 5.
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articulated with considerable force and clarity by Jurgen
Habermas as a part of his project to clarify the
epistemological status of critical theory.
The claim has been variously stated but is
essentially this: Marx's theory is latently obj ectivistic
due to a restrictive, instrumental understanding of the
concept of labor. In this light, Marx's theory is a form
of positivism and scientistic in epistemological
orientation. A further and related claim is that as a
result of the above Marx's theory lacks an adequate
normative foundation and thus can not sustain a critique
of capitalism. An even further expansion of this claim,
and one which makes clear the political dimension of this
debate, is that this series of errors and misconceptions
on Marx's part lie at the root of the subsequent
development of a bureaucratic and technocratic variety of
social theory.
While there have been numerous scholarly works on
Habermas and the Frankfurt School,^ few have raised the
issue of whether or not this interpretation is correct.
Geuss correctly notes that this "...would require a
full-scale analysis of Marx's work..." However, he states
^ notably by McCarthy (1978), Kortian (1980), Sensat
(1979) and Geuss (1981).
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that "...it isn't clear how the answer to this historical
question would bear on... the possibility of a critical
theory.^ I will maintain that the answer to this question
bears powerfully and centrally on the philosophical
foundations of critical theory.
Marx was a philosopher who retrained himself as an
economist. While Marx did not produce a work of
philosophy that systematically elaborated his theoretical
assumptions, he nonetheless held to certain assumptions
that informed and structured his work. In fact, these
philosophical assumptions infuse his 'mature' work and a
reading of books like Capital that fails to account for a
philosophic dimension are impoverished. What we think
these assumptions are, and specifically the meaning we
give to Marx's concept of labor, has a direct and
significant impact on our understanding of the problem of
the epistemological and normative foundations of critical
theory that Habermas and others are investigating and wish
to clarify.
Critical theorists draw upon two major figures in the
Western intellectual tradition as prototypical of a social
and political theory with an interest in emancipation:
^ (1981) , p. 3
.
4
Marx and Freud. Despite innumerable treatments of both
theorists, there is little agreement to be found in the
literature. Rather than agreement and consensus, what one
finds in the secondary literature are deep philosophical,
political and ideological cleavages. Debates on Marx,
perhaps more than any other theorist, reflect these
cleavages
.
Precisely because of the fundamental issues raised in
Marx's challenge to traditional theory much of the debate
on Marx is carried out in highly reified terms. For
example, debate is often cast in terms of schools of
thought interpreting another school of thought's
interpretation. Indeed, Geuss poses the question in
precisely these terms: that is, is the 'Frankfurt reading'
of Marx correct or not?
Raising the question in this manner presupposes some
untenable abstractions. Ignoring for the moment who is
and is not a member of the Frankfurt School (or whose
theory is an instance of Frankfurt theory) we must assume
there is a theory separate and abstracted from the
particular individuals who comprised the Frankfurt School.
We must then look for that part of 'Frankfurt theory'
which constitutes an interpretation of Marx.
5
This may be convenient in as much as it frees one
from considering the history of particular theorists at
particular stages of their intellectual development. m
the convenience, however, lies the risk. The risk is the
loss of the historical dimension. The loss of the rich
context and historical diversity of individual
intellectual development, the historical context of
issues, debates and understandings, how they arise and how
theorists responded, leaves our understanding
impoverished.
For these reasons I will not focus on such issues as
the relationship of Habermas to the Frankfurt School, Marx
and Marxism, the Frankfurt School and Marx, or Habermas
and Marxism. Nor will the subsequent analysis be cast in
terms of "being informed by" or "derived from" any
theorist or school of thought.
The focus of this work is Habermas and Marx. The
analysis presented below will deal with Marxism briefly
and only to note the extent that Habermas' analysis is
weakened by a failure to adequately distinguish between
Marx and his epigones.
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I begin with a summary of Habermas- analysis of Marx.
The claims Habermas makes with respect to Marx's concept
of labor, scientistic and positivistic tendencies
in Marx, and emancipatory interest will be spelled out and
some preliminary objections raised.
I then turn to a reconstruction of Marx's concept of
labor in its anthropological, ontological, epistemolgical
,
and economic dimensions. l advance the thesis that Marx's
theory is coherent and that each of the above dimensions
is structured by an appearance/reality distinction and a
distinction between metatheoretical and historical levels
of analysis.
The term 'reconstruction' means the reproduction of
an author's meaning and argument by the discovery and
elaboration of the 'rules' the author follows in
constructing his or her theory. The rules of a game
constrain a participant to known or knowable patterns of
thought and/or action. An observer, who may not know or
only partially know the rules, must attempt to construct
the rules from the players actions. In this vein, I
attempt to read-off the rules that structure Marx's work
and to re-present Marx's work. I will, in Habermas'
terms, "explicate the meaning of a symbolic formation in
7
terms of the rules according to which the author must have
brought it forth...
On the basis of the analysis in Chapter Two, I argue
in the concluding Chapter that Habermas ' analysis of
Marx's concept of labor is, at best, partial, and at worst
results from a fundamental misunderstanding of the
structure of Marx's thought. In effect, Habermas falls
prey to the problem that animates Adorno ' s epistemological
theory: non-identity. in other words, Marx's theory can
not be subsumed by Habermas' framework of knowledge
constitutive interests. I will then examine the
implications of this for Habermas' project of
reconstituting the normative foundations of critical
social theory.
The Terms of the Debate
There is no concept more centrally important to the
interpretation of Marx's social and political philosophy
than labor. The meaning of the term has important
consequences for an interpretation of all aspects of
Marx's theory. The ontological, epistemological,
(1979) , p. 12
.
anthropological, ethical, political and economic
assumptions of Marx are all closely bound up with the
meaning of the concept.
The problem of interpreting Marx's theoretical
assumptions has occupied the attention of scholars and
polemicists, a distinction frequently hard to make, for
the better part of the last century. Not surprisingly,
there is little consensus. On a general level of
interpretation, one cannot help but be intrigued by the
starkly contradictory claims made about Marx. To his
adherents he is the greatest of the classical political
economists but to his opponents he is a minor
post-Ricardian^ He is either a "great systematic
philosopher in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant and
Hegel"^ or a largely confused, unclear contradictory
thinker.'' His literary abilities are equally suspect;
either the man's style is opaque and utterly lacking in
clarity or it is rich, lucid, powerful and evocative.^
^ Sameulson (1957), p. 911.
^ Gould (1978) , p. xi.
Plamenatz (1975), p. 449-450.
g for an analysis of the interrelationship of
philosophical, literary and economic themes in Capital see
R.P. Wolff (1980). For a summary of the widely held view




The situation improves little, if at all, when one
examines more specific areas of debate over Marx's
assumptions. with respect to ontology, Marx is
undoubtedly a materialist but what kind of materialist is
in doubt. Is Marx's epistemology simply an inversion of
Hegel replacing spirit with matter or is the question more
complicated? Did Marx hold a copy or reflection theory of
knowledge or does the theory of false-consciousness and
fetishism imply a more sophisticated and highly mediated
theory of the relationship of being and consciousness?
Did Marx hold any theory of human nature and if so what
was it, i.e., was he a humanist or theoretical
anti-humanist? In the realm of ethics, was Marx's
critique of capitalism based solely on moral outrage or
was it scientific and therefore more effective and valid
because it was not compromised by emotion, values and
other infections of irrationality? What political
position did Marx hold: was he a radical democrat,
totalitarian or, perhaps, an anarchist? Finally, is the
labor theory of value metaphysical baggage that can be
discarded with no harm to Marx's theory of capitalism, or
is it the key to unlocking the mysteries of capitalist
development?'
' see Steedman (1977) , Lippi (1979) and Bowles and
Gintis (1981) .
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Implicitly, the question of Marx's theoretical
assumptions was raised when he declared to La Fargue:
"One thing is certain— I myself am no Marxist." with this
remark Marx distanced himself from the positions of the
growing socialist labor movement in Germany. From that
point on, the extent to which the socialist movement could
be identified with Marxian theory, regardless of the
self-understandings of Bernstein, Kautsky, Plekhonov and
generations of others, is in doubt.
Explicitly, the question of Marx's presuppositions
became a heated and central issue following the collapse
of socialism at the outbreak of World War I, the failure
of socialist revolutions in Western Europe following the
war, and the emerging criticism of Lenin's political
theory. The major figures in this re-evaluation of the
presuppositions of Marxist orthodoxy are well known as are
the debates they initiated over the theory and practice
of Marxism: Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, Rosa Luxemburg and
Antonio Gramsci. One central argument advanced by both
Lukacs and Korsch was that orthodox Marxists had 1)
fetishized facts and the laws of history, and 2) viewed
scientific socialism more and more as a set of purely
11
scientific observations J° As Habermas would almost fifty
years later, Lukacs and Korsch made the dissolution of
Marxism into a kind of positivism concerned with facts,
laws, and empirical, objective analysis, a primary target
of their critique.
By the turn of the century, Marx's theory was clearly
suffering from the vicissitudes of institutionalization:
an orthodoxy had emerged along with the Social Democratic
Parties Criticism emerged from the group of dissidents
named above. Interestingly, they tended to have strong
training in the German Idealist tradition and especially
in the works of Hegel. They began a systematic re-
thinking of Marx's theoretical assumptions and critique of
orthodox Marxism. Their writing, not only provoked a
serious re-evaluation of Marxism, but also the most
significant division in Marxian intellectual history, the
split between orthodox and Western, or Neo-Marist theory.
The questions they raised still provide the framework for
much of the theoretical debate among critical theorists.
^° Korsch (1970) , p. 60
"...the history of Marxism as a theory and practice
is marked by rather long periods in which formalism and/or
dogmatism predominate (the rise of the German Social
Democratic Party, 1880's-1914; Stalinism), punctuated by
rather brief ruptures (the new Marxism expressed by the
young Lukacs and some others in the early 1920 's; the New
Left in the 1960's). Arato and Breines (1979), p. 210.
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The criticism of Lukacs and Korsch was focused on two
positions regarded by orthodox Marxists as central tenets
of the faith, one ontological and the other
epistemological. The ontological proposition was that the
economic base determines the political, legal and cultural
superstructure. m other words, that the forms of
economic being mono-causally determine the other forms of
social being. The epsitemological proposition was that
being determines consciousness. This was embodied in the
infamous formulation that consciousness was a reflection
of being, that the mind was a copy of reality.
In hindsight, the flaws of these positions seem
almost obvious. For example, consider first the
ontological assumption. The powerful Social Democratic
Party in Germany was engaged in battles to affect the
length of the working day, wages and unionization at the
same time it was maintaining the theoretical position that
its own activity, as a social and political organization,
was strictly determined by the base that it was in the
process of changing. Secondly, their epistemology was
premised on a passive cognitive subject. With
consciousness reflecting being, orthodox Marxism either
had to abandon the possibility of a class conscious
proletariat making its own history through revolution (and
13
fall back on the position that a party elite could
engineer a revolution) or believe that revolution was
automatic working out of the contradictions of capitalism
with class consciousness as an automatic result.
Ironically, Marxism had developed into precisely the kind
of philosophical materialism that Marx "had initially
found defective: passive, contemplative, focusing
exclusively on the supposedly primary world of external
nature. "^^
In the orthodox view, the subject plays, at best, a
very small role in his own history. Broadly speaking, the
theoretical debate became a debate over the nature of the
subject, his ontological role in the creation of social
being and his status as a knowing subject. In other
words, how does the subject constitute objectivity and
does the subject actively or passively come to know its
creation? These questions require investigation into the
"active" side of the revolutionary equation: into the
problem of subjectivity, human nature and labor in the
constitution of social reality, and requires a theory of
knowledge that transcended passive materialism.
Arato, Andrew, and Paul Brienes (1979), p. 214. These
authors are correct to note that Lukacs ' critique of Engels
and Kautsky was a close equivalent of Marx's critique of
Feuerbach's materialism.
14
currently the debate over Marx's philosophical
assumptions has come to center on the concept of labor.
Labor, is construed by Habermas and Wellmer as having an
instrumental meaning. Marx's theory, which is in their
view latently positivistic and objectivistic, is
compromised both morally and philosophically by this
restrictive, instrumental concept of labor.
""^
The term 'instrumental' has played an important role
in twentieth century social theory. In Max Weber,
instrumental or formal rationality means the consideration
of the "relatively unambiguous fact that the action is
based on 'goal oriented' rational calculation with the
technically most adequate methods" and, most importantly,
calculations are made "without regard to persons. "^^
Instrumental rational social action is calculated,
efficient action. Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse argued
that Weber's formal sociological categories contained
implicit value judgements. Instrumental rationality
subtly turns into capitalist rationality, i.e., the
calculable efficiency of the capitalist enterprise. Weber
argued that in Western society instrumental rationality
was invading all realms of society, politics, social
Wellmer (1971), p. 125 and Habermas (1973), p. 281-2.
Economy and Society Vol 1. (1978), p. 83.
relations, art, architecture and music, as efficiency
out in competition with traditional forms.
15
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Agreeing, and tying this expansion to the dynamics of
capitalist exchange relations, Adorno, Marcuse and
Horkheimer argued that the 'rational' functioning of the
social apparatus tends to abridge the critical faculty of
reason in its place promoting instrumental or subjective
reason. Appropriate thought and action are then defined
by the objective requirements of the production process.
They have "become completely harnessed to the social
process... It is as if thinking itself had been reduced to
the level of industrial processes, subjected to close
schedule - in short, made part and parcel of
production. "^^ Habermas • claim that Marx's concept of
labor is instrumental is set in this context of meanings
and may be succinctly stated as follows: labor is social
action whose rationality is defined 'in toto' by the
requirements of the production process. The 'telos' of
instrumental ly rational action is power over persons and
things; the ability to manipulate and control.
This fundamental inadequacy of Marx's concept of
labor Habermas viewed as the basis for the subsequent
Horkheimer (1974), p. 21.
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bureaucratic and technocratic deformations of socialist
theory and practice that are manifest in Leninism and
Stalinism. Wellmer, for example, claims that a socialist
revolution conceived on the Marxian model can only lead to
an abrogation of liberal political freedom in favor of
"dictatorial centralism" in which an elite party organizes
a socialist state with the clearly false view that social
freedom is a technical, bureaucratic problem. Habermas
states the implications as follows:
The danger of an exclusively technical civilization
which is devoid of the interconnection between theoryand praxis, can be clearly grasped: it is threatened
by the splitting of consciousness and by the
splitting of men into two classes—the social
engineers and the inmates of closed institutions.^^
Outside the tradition of the critical theorists these
criticisms of Marx have been echoed by Charles Taylor. He
has argued that Marx's work rests on an
uneasy, if not untenable, synthesis of romantic
expressivism and nineteenth-century science. Accordingly,
Taylor claims, Marxists have adopted science, with its
epistemological telos of manipulation, as the method for
restructuring social relations. Thus, socialist planning
treats persons as objects to be manipulated, dominated and
controlled through the implementation of a technology of
human engineering. "Marxist-Leninism began to be treated
(1973) , p. 282 .
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as a blueprint in the hands of master builders rather than
the consciousness of a new age of freedom. "^^
If one accepts the premises of the above
interpretations of Marx, i.e., that Marxism lacks a
normative foundation and is fundamentally instrumental in
its orientation toward both objects and persons, one could
logically conclude that Marx's theory is at best morally
and ethically vacuous and at worst reprehensible and
dangerous. This implication is not lost on Taylor who
states:
...Marx's variant of 'absolute freedom' is at the
base of Bolshevik voluntarism which, strong with the
final justification of history, has crushed all
obstacles in its path with extraordinary
ruthlessness, and has spawned again that terror which
Hegel described with uncanny insight. ""^
Analogous arguments have, in the past, been derived
from different theoretical starting points. One may start
from Marx's supposed determinism and conclude that the
theory fails to allow for human moral autonomy,
responsibility, and freedom. Alternatively, one may start
from Marx's apparent lack of a theory of human nature and
claim that human beings are defined by their social




relationships and are simply bearers of social roles.
This can lead to the conclusion, nicely characterized by
McMurty, that:
Since there is no human nature, then the capitalistsociety Marx opposes has no fault other than
^i^jf^'^''^
°^ productive forces, and the communist
arnw^h^o^^
envisages has no human point other thang o t f such forces. Hence Marx's vision is wholly
robotr^'^
compatible with a communist society of
This interpretation of Marx's lack of a normative
foundation for critique, instrumental concept of labor,
inadequate theory of human nature and finally of a
presumed identity between Marx and Marxism leaves the
theorist with three possible alternatives. First, one may
choose to reject or abandon Marxian theory as a confused,
absurd, dangerous and morally irresponsible body of
knowledge. ^°
Second, one may choose to limit the validity of
Marx's analysis (to the extent it is not completely
compromised) to a particular historical epoch, i.e., that
it is adequate to the period of liberal capitalism.
Piccone opts for this position. While agreeing with the
above criticism of Marx's normative foundation and arguing
(1978) , p. 18.
20 • • • ...see Berlin (1957) , Historical Inevitability , and
Kamenka (19 62) , The Ethical Foundations of Marxism .
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that the Frankfurt School theorists failed similarly,
Piccone limits the validity of Marx's theory to the period
of entrepreneurial capitalism, the critical theory of
Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno to a transitional stage,
and a "yet to be developed" theory to the present period
of advanced capitalism.
The final alternative is to engage in a
systematic reconstruction of Marx's theory, to re-work it,
in order to preserve those remaining moments of truth, to
make it adequate to an analysis of advanced capitalism
and most importantly to provide a normative foundation to
ground critique.^^ This, broadly speaking, has been the
project of Habermas. However, as we shall see, Habermas'
reconstruction is inadequate and largely determined by his
attempt to develop a theory of knowledge constitutive
interests rather than being determined by the object of
investigation: Marx.
Arato and Gebhardt (1978), p.xx.
I discuss the logical structure of Habermas'
derivation of critique in language and Marx's grounding in
labor in the chapter 3
.
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Haberma^ and the Rec0n5.t-.rnnt- ^ of M;.-rv-i.n ^v.^^
Habermas regards his work as being within the Marxian
tradition and as a "reconstruction" of Marxian theory.
With regard to the first point, Habermas argues that his
investigations are 'materialist' in so far as they analyze
crisis tendencies in the spheres of social production and
reproduction. They are 'historical' because of the
attempt to analyze causal relations effective in ushering
in, maintaining and undermining historical structures of
consciousness and social being.
Regarding the second point, Habermas understands his
project as a reconstruction of historical materialism and
distinguishes between reconstruction, restoration, and
renaissance. His approach to the many social theoretic
questions and controversies that have animated debate
among Marxists during the previous century is not
"dogmatic" or "philological." His intent is not to
rediscover the 'real' Marx, whose theory had been
distorted and 'corrupted' by the vicissitudes of
subsequent adherents and epigones, though this is in
important respects the case. The trap awaiting those who
seek to proceed in this manner is the tendency to view
Marx's works as a kind of bible, the exegesis of which
will provide correct answers to problems even where Marx's
21
writings are mute on the topic. And while the study of
Marx's work has suffered from a more or less hostile
intellectual climate in the Western world, it is not a
tradition long suppressed and buried by the intellectual
and cultural hegemony of bourgeois traditions. Indeed,
announcements of the death of Marxian theory have been
frequent but, nonetheless, premature. Thus Habermas does
not view Marxian theory as being in need of a renaissance.
Habermas defines his intention of "reconstructing"
Marxism as taking the "...theory apart and putting it back
together again in a new form in order to attain more fully
the goal it has set for itself. "^^ it remains a theory
whose potential is not exhausted. Marx's theory thus can
be said to be in need of reworking in order to be adequate
to its task of liberating society from the domination of
capital. If Marxism is in need of reconstruction one
assumption can be made: the historical conditions Marx
sought to analyze have changed. Thus Habermas
investigates the nature of these changes and their
consequences for Marxism.
The first of these changes is the relationship of
politics and the economy. The liberal capitalist
(1979) , p. 95.
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separation of the state and society no longer obtains in
advanced capitalist society. Rather, the state and
society are closely intertwined. The growth of capitalist
production outpaced the ability of the free market
exchange of commodities to regulate production and
distribution. Capitalist development in its more advanced
states required greater administration in production
planning, securing stable markets, etc., thus superseding
some market functions. At the same time, capital-labor
conflicts resulted in what Habermas calls the
"...political mediation of ... commerce . Thus he argues
that classical Marxist conception of the dependence of
polity on the base is no longer adequate for an analysis
of advanced capitalism.
Iri Legitimation Crisis this point is elaborated. A
clear example of the interdependence of base and polity is
the development, in reaction to endemic economic crisis,
of a "quasi-political wage structure . "^^ The
institutionalization of capital-labor conflict through
union recognition by the state and the establishment of a
new state function of managing wage negotiations shifts a
portion of the reproduction of capitalist relations to the
(1973) , p. 195.
Habermas (1978), p. 38
state. That is, the reproduction of labor power as a
commodity and the price it receives are determined by a
politically regulated class compromise. One significant
result, beside a tendency toward labor peace rather than
class conflict, is a flattening of business cycles "and
transforming periodic phases of capital devaluation into
permanent inflationary crisis with milder business
fluctuations. . . "^'^
23
A further, and often discussed example of the changed
relation of polity and economy is government subsidy by
either direct spending or tax expenditures of the
development of new technology such as nuclear power,
semiconductors and computers and new aviation
technologies. Without government support through
procurement, assuming research costs, etc., the massive
capital accumulation required for competitive production
would be impossible through private capital market forces
alone. One is led to conclude that judicious and
well-planned government intervention in the economy is
essential in advanced capitalism.
Whether the changed relations of economics and
politics in advanced capitalism requires a reformulation
Ibid.
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of Marx's characterization of the notorious base/
superstructure relationship depends, of course, on what
kind of position is either imputed to Marx or argued to be
consistent with Marxian theory. As Habermas recognizes,
there are three different accounts of the base/
superstructure relationship.
The first, which one might call the strong, orthodox
or economistic, version holds that there is an ontological
priority of the base over the superstructure. in this
version a social formation is conceived as a number of
'levels'; the forces and relations of production being the
foundation upon which the polity, law, and culture
(ideology) are built. There is, as Habermas puts it, a
"causal dependency" of the "higher subsystems" on the
base. This version, with its clear scientistic and
positivistic overtones has been under severe and cogent
criticism for decades. Both Lukacs and Korsch, while
taking slightly different approaches, rejected this
version in the early 1920 's. In orthodox Marxism, the
various phenomena of the superstructure, law, policy,
morality, and ideology acquired the status of a
'pseudo-reality' somehow less 'real' (since less
'material') than the base. As Korsch trenchantly puts it,
the economistic version "...can be formulated concisely,
with only a slight caricature, by saying. .. there are three
25
degrees of reality: the economy, which in the last
instance is the only objective and totally non-ideological
reality; 2) Law and the State, which are somewhat less
real because clad in ideology; and 3) pure ideology which
is objectless and totally unreal ('pure rubbish '). "^^
The weaker position is, in Engels famous phrase, that
the base determines the superstructure only in the final
analysis. This more plausible version asserts that the
base sets limits or constraints on the development of, and
actions by the agents in, the superstructure.
The third version, characteristic of Hegelian
Marxists and generally of the western neo-Marxist
tradition, is a conception of the totality of social
relationships which eschews an architectonic model of
levels of social organization. This version, which
Habermas correctly ascribes to Lukacs, Korsch and Adorno,
conceptualizes society as a totality in which different
aspects, e.g., base, polity, etc., are defined by their
determinate interrelations with all other aspects.
Recently, structuralist theorists have
reconceptualized the base/superstructure problem in a
Korsch (1970) , p. 82
.
26
manner similar to the Neo-Marxists . This change was
undertaken in order to prevent a theoretically induced
blindness to the importance of social, normative and moral
practices that characterized orthodox Marxism.
The second change reflected in advanced capitalism is
that capitalist exploitation no longer coincides with the
abject poverty of the working class. As Habermas states
it: "The interest in the emancipation of society can no
longer be articulated directly in economic terms.
•Alienation- has been deprived of its palpable economic
form as misery, "^s The horrors of the work place
documented so compellingly by Marx have been largely
mitigated by increased power of trade unions and
government regulation of the work place. Although, while
the physical costs to labor have decreased, the psychic
costs seem to grow; physical pathology seems to have been
replaced by psychopathology
.
The third change, which is the logical consequence of
the "embourgeoisment" of the proletariat, is that its role
as the catalyst of revolution "...has been dissolved."
While the vast majority of the population is, by the
objective standard of class position, still proletarian.
(1973) , p. 195.
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as they do not own or control the means of production, the
subjective conditions of class consciousness
"...especially a revolutionary class consciousness, is not
to be found in the main strata of the working class
today. ^j^^g disjunction between object and subject,
which so profoundly influenced the Frankfurt School, still
persists. Even where critical thinking is alive it lacks
an audience audience whose collective self-deceptions, or
perhaps self-understandings, are well armored and defended
against cries for enlightenment.
The fourth and final change Habermas notes is the
effects the Russian Revolution and subsequent
institutionalization of the Soviet state have had on
Marxian theory. The Russian Revolution, Habermas argues,
originally had "no immediate socialist aims". However, by
maintaining and expanding a state bureaucracy controlled
by a party elite, it was able under Stalin "to initiate
the socialist revolution from above. "^° The success of
the Soviet system, both in maintaining its territorial
integrity and in rapid industrialization, left it a
formidable world power that was seen as a threat to
existing capitalist states.
(1973) , p. 196.
Ibid., p. 197.
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Regardless of how one evaluates the course of Soviet
history from the Revolution on, it is clear that a
repressive state apparatus exists in the Soviet Union and
it has no special exemptions from the historical
requirement of all repressive states to legitimate itself.
As this could only consistently be done using Marx's
theories interpreted through Lenin's political practice,
Marxist-Leninism became a legitimating ideology
hegemonically and ruthlessly imposed on all spheres of
social life. What Habermas calls a 'paralysis' of
discussion with and among Marxists is a result of the
institutionalization of Marxism in the Soviet Union and
the different theoretical trajectories that resulted from
the subsequent development of a "Western Marxism".
Epistemoloqy and Knowledge Constitutive Interests
In light of the four changes elaborated above,
Habermas understands his theoretical project as a
comprehensive reworking of Marxian theory in order to make
it adequate to an analysis of advanced capitalism. This
involves a reconceptualization of not just the issues
discussed above but also such questions as: is the concept
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discussed above but also such questions as: is the concept
of social labor adequate for distinguishing between
humans and animals and what is an adequate theory of
social evolution? Habermas • interests do not, however,
end there. He has also reformulated epistemological
theory in a manner that accounts logically for the
interests that inform, or constitute, knowledge. Finally,
he has developed a theoretical construct that can, he
argues, provide a normative foundation for critical
theory—the ideal speech situation.
In Habermas' terms, Marx's theory is both
instrumental and emancipatory in its orientation. It is
instrumental because Marx failed to understand his
theoretical assumptions completely thus miscasting his
theory in a scientistic manner. Habermas' analysis, to
which we now turn, is designed to locate this tendency
within Marx.
Habermas' epistemological theory is as suggestive as
it is controversial. He posits three knowledge
constitutive interests that are anthropologically deep-
seated: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and
critical. The interests which lie behind these types of
theory are technical control, practical understanding, and
emancipation, respectively.
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The empirical-analytic sciences have as there
orientation the production of nomological , or law-like,
statements that are deductive and predictive. The
empirical sciences, which methodologically detach the
subject from the universe of facts, separate descriptive
from prescriptive statements and facts from values,
functionally proscribe self-reflective knowledge and
prevent the understanding of the social constitution of
facticity
.
The hermeneutic method, originally developed as a
philological and historical methodology, differs
substantially from the empirical-analytical method.
Hermeneutics offers an approach concerned with the
explication of meaning and the interpretation of texts.
The interest of the investigator is not technical control
of natural processes but the understanding of cultural
phenomena. Knowledge is achieved through the
confrontation of an interpreter, who necessarily brings
along his or her own baggage of pre-understandings , and an
object of interpretation, such as a text or work of art.
The result is a process of contextual analysis that issues
in a clarification of obscurities in the understanding of
the text and a more coherent interpretation. The interest
which guides hermeneutic inquiry is a practical interest
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in sustaining traditional meanings and the "preservation
and expansion" of intersubjectivity. "The understanding
of meaning is directed in its very structure toward the
attainment of possible consensus among actors in the
framework of a self-understanding derived from
tradition. "-^^
Now while the social sciences have adopted the
positivist goal of technical control through knowledge of
the law-like regularities of social action, one tradition
of social theory goes beyond that aim. Critical social
theory remains profoundly suspicious of law-like
regularities in conduct when such regularities can be
demonstrated to be fetishized relations of domination
ideologically understood (or misunderstood) as natural
rather than social phenomena. Individuals can be released
from such relations of domination because they are social
products and can, in principle, be transformed through
self-reflection undertaken to free "...the subject from
dependence on hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is
determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest".
(1971) , p. 310.
(1971) , p. 310.
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Labor as InRtrnmpntal Rf^^^^nn
The question can now be raised: how does Marx's
theory stand in relation to Habermas- epistemological
typology? Or, to state it differently: what is the
epistemological status of Marx's theory? Versions of
Marxist theory that have evolved into legitimating
ideologies clearly exhibit instrumental and positivistic
tendencies. Habermas maintains that these scientistic
tendencies are, as previously noted, internal to Marx's
theory. But he also maintains that Marx's theory is a
paradigmatic expression of a critical theory with an
emancipatory intent. Indeed, he argues that critical
self-reflection is also part of the internal structure of
Marx's thought. Thus, Marxian theory embodies two
apparently contradictory knowledge constitutive interests
Furthermore, we may assume that Marxian theory lacks the
practical interest in maintaining inter-subjectivity
manifested in hermeneutic and interpretive theory. We
shall now turn to an examination of Habermas' analysis of
instrumental rational interest as manifested in Marx's
work.
I shall begin with Habermas' discussion of the
theoretical linkages between Marx and the German idealist
3
philosophers. in the Economic^nd_P2^^
0^^844.'' Marx breaks with Hegel on the question of the
identity of spirit and nature. Nature is not the Mind
externalized. Rather nature, both "objective and
subjective," is a substratum "on which the mind
contingently depends". Here the mind presupposes
nature, but in the sense of a natural process that
"...gives rise likewise to the natural being man and the
nature that surrounds him - and not in the idealist sense
of a mind that, as Idea existing for itself, posits a
natural world as its own self-created presupposition".^^
In this fashion Marx sunders the presupposition of
identity in Hegel.
Habermas concedes that what Marx advances against
Hegel is no crude materialism. In other words, Habermas
does not attribute to Marx the simplistic reflection
theories of orthodox Marxism. That he is no crude
materialist is indicated by Marx's first "Thesis on
Feuerbach" wherein the concept of labor is revealed to
be not only an anthropological but an epistemological or
Marx and Engels (1975)
.
(1971) , p. 26.
(1971) , p. 26.
Marx and Engels (1976)
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knowledge-constitutive concept as well. it is here,
Habermas argues, Marx's characterization of man as an
objective being acquires the additional meaning of
constituting the possible objects of experience. Social
reality as it appears is subject to the conditions of the
social production of possible objects of experience.
History then is not the product of transcendental
consciousness in general but rather of individuals in
society producing and reproducing their existence through
interaction with nature.
Social labor is for Marx a perpetual necessity of
human life and involves a "metabolism" between men and
nature through which nature can be appropriated in a
usable form. Because man is a natural being, this nature
includes subjective human nature and the nature of the
external environment. Thus this material exchange between
man and nature is also a process of nature mediating
itself.
External nature loses its facticity and becomes
mediated by subjective nature through social labor. This
gets at a basic point Habermas wishes to make: labor is an
epistemological category because the social appropriation
(1971) , p. 27.
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of nature both reproduces society and the objectivity of
objects of experience that constitute consciousness.
Habermas then states "The category of man as a tool making
animal signifies a schema both of action and apprehending
the world. This indicates the appearance of what is
the dominant theme of Habermas- analysis of Marx: social
labor is instrumental activity which necessarily results
in an instrumental mode of apprehending the world. The
adequacy of this analysis is the central question
investigated in this work.
Habermas warns the reader of an immanent
"transcendental-logical" error, i.e., do not construe
labor, as have Marcuse, Sartre and Kosik, as "world
constituting life activity in general. "^^ The fundamental
importance of social labor is "...only as the category of
mediating objective and subjective nature. It designates
the mechanism of the evolution of the species. "^°
As defined by Habermas, the options are either to
construe labor in a restrictive manner or as a general
concept. Indeed, here is the conceptual bind: labor is
instrumental and if it has any other apparent meanings or
(1971) , p. 28
.
(1971) , p. 28.
(1971) , p. 29
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levels Of meanings the interpreter has made a philosophic
error. Wherein lies the error: is it in a philosophical
notion of labor as that which constitutes history and
social being, or is it in the tightly defined economic
definition of labor?
Habermas next raises the question of a philosophical
anthropology. According to Marx, the human animal
distinguishes itself by ensuring societal reproduction
through social labor. Thus any anthropology that fails to
comprehend human nature as a product of historical
development should be rejected. In Habermas- words
"...the human species is not characterized by any
invariant natural or transcendental structure. The
evolutionary concept of the 'nature of man' unmasks
philosophical anthropology as an illusion. ..
Now, while Marx saw social labor as both constitutive
of social objectivity and social consciousness and further
that self-reflective consciousness could lay bare the
actual synthesis of subjective and objective nature, he
did not, Habermas claims, "arrive at an explicit concept
of this synthesis. "^^ Habermas' task then is to
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(1971) , p. 29
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(1971) , p. 30.
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reconstruct a materialist concept of synthesis and
differentiate it from its meanings in German Idealist
philosophy.
In contrast to Kant, Fichte and Hegel, synthesis in
Marx is neither a function of logic nor consciousness, but
a result of social labor. The philosopher ought not turn
to logic, language or symbols, but rather ought to look at
political economy and production. "Synthesis no longer
appears as an activity of thought but as one of material
production. The model for the spontaneous reproduction
processes of society is the production of nature rather
than those of mind."^-^
In Habermas' interpretation, Marx's concept of
synthesis retains something of Kant's distinction between
form and matter. The difference is that the forms are not
ahistorical but rather reflect the contours of social
activity. But the most Kantian aspect of Marx's theory,
Habermas argues, "is the invariant relation of the species
to its natural environment, which is established by the






The necessity of labor for continued existence leads
to a fundamental, virtually apriori structuring of thought
and action on instrumental lines. This Kantian aspect of
Marx has its implications in the pragmatic or
instrumentalist theory of knowledge elaborated by Pierce
and Dewey. This type of epistemology can comprehend the
relationship of materialism and the natural sciences
because "...the technically exploitable knowledge that is
produced and tested in research processes of the natural
sciences belongs in the same category as the pragmatic
knowledge of everyday life acquired through trial and
error in the realm of feedback-controlled action. ""^^
Whether knowledge acquired in everyday life can be so
understood is open to question. Less questionable,
however, is Habermas' claim that the obj ectification of
instrumental knowledge in the forces of production reacts
upon subsequent generations and thus affects the
development of new instrumental or technical knowledge.
There are, however, distinctly non-Kantian aspects to
Marx's theory. As Habermas states it, Kanf's "...pure
apperception produces the representation 'I think', which
must be able to accompany identically all other
representations, without this representation being able to
(1971) , p. 36.
39
be accompanied by and reflected by a further one."^^
Fichte's position goes even further by arguing that
self-consciousness is achieved by abstracting from the
content of thought while maintaining the self as an
"identical ego." Thus, there is no primacy to either the
ego or self- consciousness. The ego comes into existence
through the activity of self-consciousness, and neither
can be posited without the experience of being that is
non-ego.
As "socially laboring subjects", individuals confront
an environment (both social and natural) that is formed in
the labor process. Thus for Marx social consciousness is
formed by the historically existent forces and relations
of production as they have been formed by the activity of
preceding generations. It is through the synthesis of the
labor process that the "species first posit (s) itself as a
social subject."'^''
With the discussion summarized above, Habermas places
Marx's position in the context of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
Marx rejects at least two of Kant's epistemological
assumptions; that of a "fixed knowing subject and that of
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(1971) , p. 37.
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(1971) , p. 39
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the distinction between theoretical and practical reason."
This is achieved through adopting Hegel's critique. What
Marx does not adopt from Hegel is the philosophy of
identity, that is, the assumption that categories of
thought subsume the material reality they purport to
explain without, as Adorno puts is, leaving a remainder.
But Marx failed to integrate in his "philosophical frame
of reference" structures of communication, "symbolic
interaction and the role of cultural tradition, which are
the only basis on which power and ideology can be
comprehended. "^^
Here, again, there is a degree of ambiguity in
Habermas' application of his epistemological typology.
Habermas contends Marx did not completely eliminate
symbolic interaction, intersubjectivity , and cultural
tradition from his analyses and in fact these aspects ar
evident in his practice of inquiry. In other words,
although the concepts of labor and self-reflection are
both employed in his empirical studies Marx nevertheless
had, in Habermas' view, a restricted philosophical
understanding of his "practice" in which self-reflection
is reduced to instrumental activity. That is to say,
Marx's, or the materialist, concept of synthesis is too
(1971) , p. 42
.
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narrow to adequately comprehend the dimensions of symbolic
interaction, tradition and the critique of ideology.
Positivi sm in Marv
Marx's theory is thus unable to provide a theoretical
basis for self-reflective knowledge and, Habermas,
contends is therefore unable to prevent a positivist
dissolution (or resolution) of a broad range of
theoretical, but most specifically epistemological
,
issues. The "immanent" reason for this failure is the
" reduction of the self-generati ve act of the specie;:, to
labor. ""^^ Despite the fact that Marx's
theory includes a systematic understanding of social
relations, "symbolic interaction" and "cultural
tradition", these insights are not systematically
incorporated into his theoretical frame of reference.
This leaves Marx with a gap between his "practice of
inquiry" and theoretical self-understanding. That is to
say Marx, in his work, accounted for labor, social
interaction and symbolic interaction, yet he still
misunderstands this practice and "interprets what he does
(1971) , p. 42.
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in the more restricted conception of the species self-
reflection through work alone.
Habermas states his central claim in the following
ways. "Marx reduces the process of reflection to the
level of instrumental action. . .Marx conceives of
reflection according to the model of production..." and
finally, "Marx deludes himself about the nature of
reflection when he reduces it to labor. "^^
These characterizations indicate an implicit problem
with Habermas' analysis: labor, instrumental action and
production are each identified with the others. One way,
I suggest, to approach the question of the accuracy of
Habermas' interpretation of Marx is, therefore, to pose
the question: did Marx conceive of labor, instrumental
action and production as identical terms? The analysis of
Marx in Chapter Two will investigate this question by
focusing on the conceptual structure that Marx employs.
By disentangling the meanings and levels of analysis of
labor through a reconstruction of Marx, further light can
be shed on this question.
(1971) , p. 42
.




One area in which Marx's failure to distinguish
between labor and interaction that has important
consequences is the question of the distinction between
the natural and cultural sciences. While failing to
address the logical status of critique and science,
Habermas claims Marx did not eliminate the distinction:
between the two. The ambiguity is reflected in Marx'
clear intention of establishing a 'critique- of political
economy versus his tendency to identify his theory with
the natural sciences.
In Habermas' reading, Marx intends to uncover "the
economic law of motion of modern society as a 'natural
52law'." This interpretation is buttressed by references
to the epilogue to the Second Edition of Capital
, and by
appeal to the German Ideology , which presumably shows that
even the young Marx held to this positivist position. The
relevant passage from the German Ideology is: "Natural
science will eventually subsume the science of man just as
the science of man will subsume natural science: there
will be a single science."" This passage, seemingly
ambiguous and Utopian enough, is in Habermas' reading a
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(1971) , p. 45.
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(1971) , p. 46.
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Clear call for a "natural science of man" with
"astonishing" positivistic implications.
Through this interpretation of Marx's attitude toward
the natural sciences and the relationship of science to
industry, Habermas argues that the production process
constitutes "the only framework in which the genesis and
function of knowledge can be interpreted ... "^^ Thus Marx
subsumed the human sciences under the categories of
instrumental knowledge for the purpose of control.
Knowledge of persons, social interaction etc., becomes
knowledge of the power of social control and manipulation.
This is further evidenced, Habermas maintains, in the
controversial passage on science and industry in the
Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomip, . As
interpreted by Habermas, Marx here constructs a model of
social evolution in which social consciousness is
determined strictly by technological development.
"According to this construction the history of
transcendental consciousness would be no more than the
residue of the history of technology."" The relevant
passage, as interpreted by Habermas, again realizes the
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intention of the -early Marx- to construct a natural
science of man. Habermas terms the above reflections by
Marx rather unorthodox. That is to say they are not taken
up in capital
,
for which the Grundris^P was a rough draft.
In other writings, Habermas contends, Marx did not argue
that the development of technology led to the liberation
of social subjects from domination by capital. in other
places "Marx very precisely distinguished the
self-conscious control of the social life process by the
combined producers from an automatic reaulatinn of the
process of production that has become independent of these
individuals . "^^
This again points to Habermas' perception of a
fundamental ambiguity in Marx's theoretical framework: he
sometimes views social labor (instrumental activity) as
the foundation of social consciousness, at other times he
recognizes that technological development of the
productive forces cannot lead to emancipation without self
consciousness. Society may free itself from domination of
external nature through social labor and the acquisition
of technically useful knowledge but emancipation from the
domination of social institutions can only be achieved
through reconstructed social and communicative relations
(1971) , p. 51.
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that are "free from domination." The latter can only be
realized through class struggle and critical theoretical
reflection. The attempt by Marx to capture these two
dimensions in the concepts of forces and relations of
production was unsuccessful because the meaning of
this -dialectic must remain unclarified as long as the
materialist synthesis of man and nature is restricted to
the categorical framework of production." m sum, Marx's
materialist synthesis of Kant, Fichte and Hegel is
inadequate for its failure to account for the dimension of
"self-formation through critical revolutionary
activity. "^^
Habermas contends that one must turn to the early
writings of Hegel to find an analysis of the dialectic of
moral life adequate to comprehend the dimension of social
and symbolic interaction. On the basis of this moral
dialectic Habermas suggests that Marx could have analyzed
exploitation as a crime and revolution as morally
justified retribution imposing the "causality of fate
upon the rulers."^®
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It is not, however, a moral dialectic that is the
center of Marx's critique of capitalism. Capitalism
relies not on religion for legitimation, but on a secular
ideology of equal exchange in the market. Capitalism
justifies itself on the basis of this socially produced
illusion that is manifested in the consciousness of all
classes. The appropriation of the surplus by the dominant
class in capitalist society is kept obscured by the
commodification of all aspects of the reproduction of
social life, including labor, and their exchange in the
marketplace. The development of productive forces, i.e.,
the objectification of social labor as manifested in
tangible wealth, makes at least theoretically possible the
recognition of the disproportionate relation of the
possibilities of social life to the actualities of
existent social life. Reflection that can pierce the
illusions of commodity fetishism and grasp the disparity
of actuality and possibility takes the social form of a
class conscious proletariat and class struggle. Habermas
makes this point quite succinctly: "The development of
the forces of production at any time augments the
disproportion between institutionally demanded and
objectively necessary repression, thereby making conscious
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the existing untruth, the felt disruption of a moral
totality.
On this basis Habermas argues there are two
implications for social theory. First, social theory is
"continuous" with self-reflective class consciousness.
Second, social theory must recognize that it is implicated
in the process it seeks to understand. The epistemic
subject "...must direct the critique of ideology at
itself. "^° In other words, if the subject wishes to break
the spell of objective illusion, commodity fetishism, and
the weight of cultural tradition, it must reflect upon and
understand its formation in the context of the history of
social labor and consciousness.
Habermas summarizes his critique of Marx in the
following way:
...if social practice does not only accumulate the
successes of instrumental action but also, through
class antagonism, produces and reflects an objective
illusion, then, as a part of this process, the
analysis of history is possible only in a
phenomenologically mediated mode of thought. The
science of man is critique and must remain so.^^
(1971) , p. 61.
(1971) , p. 61.
(1971) , p. 62.
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Emancipatory Interest in Mary
The epistemological status of Marxian theory, as
previously noted, is not unambiguous. it is instrumental
in its orientation as well as critical and
self-reflective. While, for Habermas, the natural
sciences are paradigmatic of an interest in technical
control, Marx's and Freud's theories are paradigmatic of
emancipatory interest. Marxism, as a form critical
theory, should have critical self-reflection built into
its very theoretical structure as well as specifying the
historical conditions in which self-reflection is possible
and how self-reflection is blocked. Thus the
methodological status of Marxian theory is qualitatively
different from the natural sciences and the
Geistwissenschaften . It is neither science nor philosophy
but somehow between science and philosophy.
The unique status of Marxian theory is described by
Habermas in the following passage:
Historical materialism aims at achieving an
explanation of social evolution which is so
comprehensive that it embraces the interrelationships
of the theory's own origins and application. The
theory specifies the conditions under which
reflection on the history of our species by members
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possible^^^"6^2®^
themselves has become objectively
While it specifies its origins and applications, it goes
further to specify the audience that it seeks to
enlighten. This critical dimension separates it from the
"objectivistic posture" of the sciences and from the
"monologic" and contemplative forms of traditional
philosophy.
As noted above, the 'elevation' of Marxian theory
into dogma, and the historic confrontation of the two
world systems has distorted and frequently paralyzed
discussion and understanding of Marx. In the United
States, the study of Marxism has flourished during the
last decade prompted in part by the experience of the
1960 's and the attempt to find a mode of analysis to
replace a discredited positivism. This search has been
largely carried out within the academic division of labor:
Marxian economics, sociology, political science, history
and philosophy have all developed and flourished. The
work within these fields however is not cut of the same
cloth. There are significant and persistent divisions
between explicitly orthodox and heterodox theorists, the
implicitly orthodox, the philosophically inclined and the
(1973) , p. 1.
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empirically inclined. Hence, an important underlying
issue of academic debate is whether Marxian theory is
science, philosophy or critique.
To clarify this situation the theoretical structure
of Marxian theory and its status as critique must be
brought to light. in a brief section Habermas examines
the historical usages of critique and crisis." m its
earliest forms, crisis and critique referred to: l) the
necessity of deciding a "dispute over right..." (Greek),
2) "medical usage" (Roman), and 3) salvation (Gospel of
St. John)
.
Early bourgeois theory was comfortable with the
concept of critique as it wished to demystify existing
feudal relations. Feudal relations were dissolving on
their own and there seemed to be no concurrent societal
crisis to impel the process of critique. With the advent
of Hegel's system, however, world history was conceived
as a process of crisis ridden development. But Hegel
failed to comprehend critique as part of that development.
In Hegel, philosophy formed its own self- enclosed
totality and saw itself as a synthetic process, superior
to the crisis, not involved in it. Now, as Habermas
notes, Marx rejected this contemplative attitude while he
(1973) , p. 2
.
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was still a student/^ His own approach deliberately
restored the necessary relationship between social crisis
and critique. The exploitation of labor and the crisis
ridden development of capital provide the social basis for
the critique of political economy.
If, in capitalist society, economic factors hold
determinate power and act on society like a force of
nature, subjects must adapt to them appropriately. Marx's
theory, which understands this relationship as the
domination of dead over living labor, or as I shall stress
latter, being over becoming, strives to demistify the
relationship by showing it to be a product of social labor
under conditions of alienation and exploitation.
Herein lies the classic problem in the philosophy of
history: man makes history and can in principle know it,
but man is also made by history. Habermas expresses this
as follows:
The historical subjects are... split up into their
noumenal and phenomenal aspects: they are the authors
of their history, but still they have not yet
constituted themselves as its subject—they are at
once a causally determined species of nature and
morally free individuals.*^^
(1973) , p. 212f f
.
(1973), p. 246. Here Habermas is restating Adorno's
point thaf'Society is objective because it refers back to
the human beings who create it, and its organizational
principles too refer back to subjective consciousness and
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What Marx discovered was that what reduces subjects to a
"causally determined species" is ironically a product of
those subjects. it is the domination of dead over living
labor; capital over wage labor. Marx's theory is
emancipatory in this centrally important way: social
theory seeks enlightenment (in understanding the
conditions of the domination of capital and in explaining
why this domination is perceived as natural) and a
practical transformation of the social relations that
reproduce this domination.
Conclusion
In the foregoing exposition of Habermas' critique of
Marx I have indicated several of Habermas' most important
and controversial points. In sum, they are: social labor
is instrumental behavior. It is a 'transcendental-
logical' error to construe it otherwise. Labor is not a
general category signifying life activity. Marx's
its most general form of abstraction - logic, something
essentially subjective. Society is objective because, on
account of its underlying structure, it cannot perceive its
own subjectivity, because it does not posess a total subject
and through its organization it thwarts that installation
of such a subject." (1973), p. 54-55.
understanding of labor is: instrumental and productive
activity imposed by the necessity of transforming nature
into useful objects.
The instrumental appropriation of nature necessarily
entails an instrumental mode of apprehending the world.
Marx's instrumental ontology and anthropology implies an
instrumental epistemological theory. Instrumental
knowledge is materialized in the forces of production and
each generation must appropriate that apparatus, adapt
themselves to its constraints, and alter it through new
activity. This alienation of the collective social
product is the material basis of the claim that historical
subjects are both causally determined and morally free,
self-reflective individuals.
Marx's theory cannot account for self-reflection
since Marx conceives of self-reflection on the model of
instrumental activity. Epistemological issues will tend
to be resolved in a positivistic manner. This results in
a behavioral explanation of consciousness and a
theoretical subversion of the possibilities for
self-reflection. Thus, Marx is inclined to misunderstand
his theory as a kind of natural science.
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Whether this account is correct or not, as noted
earlier, requires a detailed and systematic study of
Marx's usage of the term labor and its role in the
structure of Marx's theory. The relevant questions raised
above are: l) is Marx's understanding of labor restricted
to instrumental activity narrowly defined; 2) did Marx
hold that the genesis and constitution of knowledge are
structured by instrumental activity); 3) did Marx
understand his work to be a kind of natural science?
These questions, which will focus the analysis in
Chapter Two, are subsumed by the more general problem
concerning the nature of Marx's epistemological
assumptions. is Marx's epistemology instrumental and
therefore positivist, or self-reflective and therefore
emancipatory? If it is both, as Habermas seems to
suggest, does this represent an inherent flaw of lack of
coherence in Marx's theory, or does the problem lie in
Habermas 's analysis of Marx and his application of the
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests? It is to
these broader questions this work now seeks to address
through a reconstruction of the structure of Marx's usage
of the concept of labor. What meanings does labor have in
the spheres of philosophical anthropology, ontology,
epistemology, and economics and what, if any, structure
can be found in the relationships between theoretical role





MARX'S CONCEPT OP LABOR
Introduction
In this chapter I will examine Marx's work to
determine the cogency of Habermas • analysis. As we have
seen, Habermas wishes to construe Marx's concept of labor
in a highly restrictive way, i.e., instrumental activity.
I will argue that this interpretation is not simply wrong,
partial or inadequate, although to an extent it is all of
these, but rather that it fails to account for the complex
and diverse meanings and theoretical functions that Marx's
writings evidence. The concept of labor in Marx cannot be
subsumed by the concept of instrumental activity as
Habermas argues.
Ultimately, Habermas' account entails a fundamental
misunderstanding of Marx's critique of capitalism, and of
the structure of Marx's thought. Indeed, it is Habermas'
failure to understand the structure of Marx's theory that
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makes his particular misinterpretation of the concept of
labor possible.
Marx's theoretical structure is, I shall argue,
doubly bisected. it is bisected first by the
appearance/reality distinction and, second, by a
distinction between the metatheoretical and historical
levels of analysis. ^6 Habermas • analysis is compromised
by his failure to take these distinctions fully into
account. Thus, he takes Marx's account of the form labor
takes in capitalist society and projects that meaning into
the metatheoretical level. By so doing, he obliterates
the distinction between the two levels of analysis and
thus fails to see that there is a normative basis other
than capitalist, instrumental rationality underlying
Marx's critique.
I begin by reconstructing Marx's assumptions about
human nature, ontology, epistemology , and economics. The
first concern is to elaborate the meaning of labor in each
Because the historical level terms in Marx's theory
are themselves theory-laden, that is are not simply
empirical, I have termed the more abstract level concepts
metatheoretical rather than theoretical. This level of
concepts will be discussed more fully in Chapter III. R.
P. Wolff [(1984), p. 114] makes a similar point arguing that
abstract homogeneous socially necessary labor is not a
descriptive concept in the sense that one can find it in
material available to the senses.
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Of these spheres. This is the necessary first step in
evaluating Haberxnas • claixn of a univocal meaning. i will
be asking i) how labor defines human nature, 2) how labor
constitutes the complex of relations between the subject
and self (internal nature), external nature, socially
produced objectivity, and others, 3) how the structure of
Marx's epistemological assumptions reflect the distinction
between appearance and reality, and, 4) the meaning of
labor in Marx's economic theory. The second concern is to
elaborate the structure of Marx's theory vis-a-vis the
above mentioned distinctions.
AS noted, many Marx interpreters have claimed to have
found some sort of split, rupture, dichotomy or
contradiction. Rejecting formulations of this sort, I
propose to demonstrate rather far reaching coherences
among the various aspects of Marx's theory. Generally, it
can be argued that a social theory is more plausible and
persuasive when its assumptions made in one aspect cohere
with parallel assumptions in other aspects. The greater
the number of coherences established, the greater the
power or explanatory force of a theory. Connolly has
explained this criterion of coherence testing as follows:
In speculative theory, claims articulated on one
domain can be checked for their consistency. . .with
assumptions accepted in others. Judgements reached
with confidence in one area can be brought to bear on
issues posed in more problematic or mysterious areas
of a theory... The more encompassing the theory, the
greater the variety of coherence tests each nf i-hocomponent parts must pass."^^
^
The coherence of Marx's assumptions in the different
spheres of his theory indicates the inadequacy of the
various "two Marx(isms).. interpretations. The coherences
established in the following pages transcend all
formulations that bear a family resemblance to the young/
old Marx controversy and/or postulate some philosophical
turning point in the evolution of his thought.
Since Marx never wrote a philosophical work
expounding on his method, interpreters are forced to
reconstruct his method and assumptions employing a
hermeneutic exercise that most nearly resembles an
intellectual jig-saw puzzle. Because most interpreters
have failed to recognize that Marx's theoretical structure
is bisected by the appearance/reality distinction and by a
historical and metatheoretical level of theory, the
resulting picture is, not surprisingly, contradictory. As
we shall see, Habermas makes this sort of error when he
takes the historically specific observation that labor is
a commodity and then projects the same meaning into the
abstract, or metatheoretical, level.
(1979) , p. 397,8.
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Finally, in approaching the question of Marx's
assumptions it is common to explicate them in relationship
to Hegel, i.e., the infamous inversion of the Hegelian
dialectic and rational kernel inside the mystical shell,
indeed, a substantial portion of scholarly disputation of
Marx resolves itself into interpretations of Hegel and
Marx's Hegel ianism. Robert Paul Wolff^^ has suggested
that a clearer understanding of Marx's Capital can be
gained if we understand its structure as an inversion of
the "Allegory of the Cave" in Plato's Republic .
Plato's allegory is the most profound statement of
the appearance/reality distinction in Western philosophy,
albeit from an idealist perspective. in Marx's reversal
of the metaphor one does not achieve enlightenment by
freeing oneself from the cave and escaping to the
sunlight. Instead, the light of the marketplace is itself
blinding. The marketplace itself creates illusions,
namely, that there rule freedom, equality, property and
Bentham.
This is the realm of appearances; a reality which
seems so clear and straight forward that participants in
it do not feel mystified and thus not in need of
(1980) .
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enlightenment. Marx's first job, like Plato-s lover of
wisdom Who escapes into the sunlight, is to convince his
audience that their marketplace creates illusions. Thus,
Marx expounds at length on the intricacies of commoditiel
and exchange.
Only then can Marx expose the reality concealed
within those illusions. "Reality lies behind the factory
door, within the dimly lighted workrooms, where men,
women, and children are chained for endless hours to
brutal machines. m the flickering light of that cave can
be seen the truth of capitalism. "^^
I suggest this analysis can be specified further. I
argue that the structure of Marx's metatheoretical
assumptions (specifically the ontological and
epistemological) also reveal a kind of inversion of
Plato's assumptions vis-a-vis the realms of being and
becoming, objectivity (fixity) and subjectivity (motion).
Examining Marx's assumptions in this light will make
clearer the central role of the concept labor on the
metatheoretical level.
(1980) , p. 763.
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Labor in M;.t-x's Anthr-npoi ...^y
in a biting aside in Capital Marx pilloried Jeremy
Bentham, "a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity," for
advancing an ahistorical, reified and one-dimensional
theory of human nature. Like the "Robinsonades"
, Bentham
erred in assuming that human nature as manifested in
nineteenth century England is the norm, "the yardstick to
be applied to the past, the present and the future." Marx
caustically notes if one wishes to discover what has
utility for a dog "one must investigate the nature of
dogs," not deduce it from utilitarian principles. Marx
goes on to say:
Applying this to man, he that would judge all human
acts, movements, relations, etc. according to the
principle of utility would first have to deal with
human nature in general, and then with human nature
as historically modified in each epoch. ^°
Interestingly, most of the discussion of Marx's
theory of human nature in the secondary literature focuses
on the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 .
Struggling as he was at that point in his life with a
critique of Hegel, Marx's language is difficult and at
times rather tortured. While there are, of course.




important insights into the problems of philosophical
anthropology to be gained from a close reading of the
Manuscripts, perhaps Marx's clearest and most conci=
single statement on the subject is the quote cited above,
ironically, references to it in the secondary literature
are virtually non-existent until recently. For example,
Schlomo Avineri, in his classic work on Marx with its
important contribution to the discussion of human nature,
never cites it. John McMurty, on the other hand, centers
his discussion of human nature precisely on the
distinction between human nature in general and as
historically modified. Undoubtedly a large part of the
reason for the focus on the early Marx to explain his
anthropology has to do with the historical circumstances
of the discovery and release of the Manuscripts.
Published in the late 1920 's, the immediately provided a
challenge to Marxian orthodoxy's general view that human
nature was little more than the sum total of existing
social relations: that consciousness reflects being.
''^
The Manuscripts provided Western Marxist with the needed
McMurty. (1978), pp. 19-53.
72 the tone, style and substance of Herbert Marcuse's
essay "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," published
in 1932 , evidence the profound impact the publication of the
Manuscripts had on theoretical debate and how they provided
ammunition for the Neo-Marxist critique of the Marxism of
the Second International. Marcuse (1972), p. 1-48.
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ammunition to challenge the orthodoxy and, in fact, spark
a new intellectual movement: Marxist Humanism.
The critical point as regards this analysis is that
Marx quite clearly distinguishes two levels of analysis of
human nature: -in general- and as 'historically modified'
or as I designate them in this analysis: metatheoretical
and historical. While the phenomenal record of human
nature in history may seem to indicate that it is dynamic
and seemingly infinitely variable, Marx argues that one
can abstract certain valid general statements. What is
constant, as Avineri puts it, "is historical creation as
constant anthropogenesis . . . On the metatheoretical
level certain characteristics may be ascribed to human
beings: they are active, objective, natural, sensuous and
social beings. And as the Marxist humanists would state
it: alienation represents the historical fate of human
nature under capitalism. Marx tried to capture the
general determinants of human nature in five terms.
Humans are active (labor), objective, natural, sensuous
and social beings.
Avineri (1968), p. 85. This is probably Avineri's
most important contribution to the interpretation of Marx's
anthropological assumptions.
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Marx Characterizes labor as a central determinant of
human nature and social relations. He notes in the
Manuscripts that a virtue of Hegel's philosophy is that it
sees the process of human self-creation, alienation,
transcendence and the "dialectic of negativity" as the
moving force in history. Hegel's dialectic is
preeminently a dialectic of labor seeking to conceptualize
the objectification of labor in objects, the loss or
alienation and the transcendence of alienated states of
being. In an oft quoted line Marx states: "Hegel's
standpoint is that of modern political economy. He grasps
labor as the essence of man..."^^ But in Hegel, objects
never appear in their material aspect; they only appear as
"consciousness or self-consciousness." Human labor
appears only as the activity of self-consciousness and in
an estranged form. Thus: "The only labor which Hegel
knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labor. "''^
Human beings are capable, through their activity, of
objectifying their activity to produce objects. Nature
supplies the materials in which labor becomes objectified
or realized. In this sense labor is a relational concept;




(1975) , p. 333
.
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Of man's being labor allows xnan "to relate to the general
aspects Of objects and to the possibilities contained in
them."^^ Every object can become the object of labor and
labor is the ability to transform the given state of an
object to realize its latent potential. Labor is thus l)
a characteristic of human nature, 2) a mediation of
subject and object, 3) transformative in that the subject
can make-over objects and 4) capable of obj ectif ication
through its -embodiment- in objects. Human labor is the
material, sensuous presentation of the subject, i.e., the
subject -s self-creation.
The activity of human subjects, Marx argues, is not
blind, random and chaotic but rather conscious,
intentional and form-giving. The objects of labor
represent a subject -s conscious intentions or purposes.
This ability of homo sapiens ^Indicates qualities unknown
in other animals. The products of labor represent
-...natural material transformed into the organs of the
human will over nature. They are organs of the human
brain, created by the human hand, the power of knowledge
objectified.-'''' The labor process in general, the
metabolism between man and nature is a process of mental
Marcuse (1972) , p. 16.
(1973) , p. 706.
68
and manual labor, of thought and thought (rule, governed
activity. in the labor process, the result is conceived
prior to the activity and the intended result "determines
the mode of his activity. "^^
Several important points should be noted here.
First, Marx's position on consciousness as a general
characteristic of human nature is one that McMurty, for
example, refers to as "projective consciousness"^' and I
refer to as rule and/or thought governed activity.
Habermas wants to maintain that Marx misunderstood the
concept of synthesis. Rather, Marx saw that synthesis is
a part of the metatheoretical constitution of social
labor. For Kant, "...synthesis is rule-directed mental
activity, "«° while for Marx, the synthetic process is
labor with rule governed thought as an aspect of that
process
.
Consciousness, and the language that structures
conscious understanding, is an integral element of the
labor process. Therefore, the attribution to Marx of a
theory of the dependency of consciousness on the labor
(1977) , p. 284
.
(1978) , p. 23-30.
Wolff (1963) , p. viii.
process, i.e., that it is solely a result of the labor
process, is false. m capitalist society, however,
conscious activity is not a characteristic of laboring
individuals. in effect, consciousness, or .ental labor,
and work, brute activity shorn of any connection to
projective consciousness, devolves on different
individuals and social classes. indeed this is the .ost
significant form of the division of labor for Marx. m
primitive society consciousness appears as a kind of
"direct efflux" of social life and the division of labor
takes a spontaneous, "natural" form.«^ However, "Division
of labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a
division of material and mental labor appears. "^^ The
elevation of the division of mental and material labor to
a principle of social organization in capitalist society
has the profoundest consequences not only for the
structure of the production process but also for the
structure of social relations and ideology (alienated
consciousness)
.
Second, consciousness, as Marx emphasizes constantly
the German Ideology, is as much a human product as a
commodity. "Men are the producers of the conceptions.
(1975) , p. 36.
(1975) , p. 44,5.
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ideas, etc., and precisely xnen conditioned by the mode of
production of their material life, by the material
intercourse and its further development in the social and
political structure. It should be clear that
consciousness, then, is not a simple result of the
producer's economic, or productive, or instrumental
activity, but rather it is conditioned by a totality of
social relations. Specifically, Marx argues that social
activity is comprised of three aspects "or, to make it
clear to the Germans, three -moments', which existed
simultaneously since the dawn of history. "^^ These
aspects are: production and the production of new needs as
the first historical act, familial relations, which in
primitive society are a dominant relation but which later
becomes a subordinate to other social relations, and
finally consciousness.
Third, it must be noted that conscious understanding,
the ideas and conceptions people hold may be both or
either real or illusory and may be either "fetters and
limitations" or enlightening. That is to say, they may be
science or ideology. When, as noted above, a division of
mental and material labor obtains for society, it can
83
(1976) , p. 36.
84
(1976) , p. 43
.
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become the case that consciousness becomes both unmoored
from social activity and the property and production of
the ruling class. When this occurs one part of the
dominant class becomes that class's thinkers, -...its
active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of
illusions of the class about itself their
chief source of livelihood." The social reproduction of
consciousness is then part of the reproduction of
relations of domination and therefore productive of
illusions and ideological justification "of the very
empirical fetters and limitations. . .which move the mode of
production of life, and the form of intercourse coupled
with it."^^
In addition to being active, objective and conscious,
humans are sensuous beings. As Marcuse has argued,
sensuousness is "an ontological concept within the
definition of man's essence. "^^ Marx's assumption is that
all human activity and knowledge must have, as a starting
point, sense perception and the orientation toward and
appropriation of objects by subjects is determined by the
historical character of the five senses.
85
(1976) , p. 45.
86
(1972) , p. 19.
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The textual indications are that Marx held a broader
concept Of sensuousness that included not only the sense
awareness of external objects and nature, but also
includes conscious awareness of the subject's body and the
perceptible needs and desires that arise or originate fro.
that body. Marx held that sense perception has a
"two-fold form", external perception and internal
perception or, as Marx phrased it, "sensuous
consciousness and sensuous need". This additional meaning
of sensuousness is evidenced by Marx's inclusion of such
faculties as feeling, wanting and loving in a listing of
sensuous relations.«^ Marx also refers to the fact that
man's active "natural powers of life" manifest themselves
"... as tendencies and abilities—as instincts" toward
external objects and these take the form of passions or
needs. Marx's concept of sensuousness can be summarized as
including 1) perception of external nature and socially
produced objects and 2) internal, subjective nature as it
is socially formed. The conscious, sensuous activity of
the subject, "each of his human relations to the world" is
constituted in the "objective orientation" and
"appropriation" of the object. The actual history of the
subject's orientation and appropriation of self (as wage
laborer) , others and nature (as utilitarian objects)
(1975) , p. 299-300.
represent, Marx argues, ontological relations in an
estranged, or historical for.. Here again Marx contrasts
"needs and enjoyment" in their egotistical and utilitarian
form with a human, social form of appropriation.
Finally, Marx defines man as a social being who takes
other individuals as objects of consciousness and
activity. Human life is always "carried out in
association with others.-^' That is to say that social
life is carried out within specific historical conditions
and the framework of a particular social formation.
Again, the textual evidence suggests Marx holds a
more complex concept of social being. He is careful to
note that human activity, even in an estranged form, is
social and that the concept of estranged, or alienated,
relations implies a concept of non-alienated relations.
Non-alienated relations, Marx argues, manifest themselves
as the need for a bond of unity between individuals and
nature.
For example, Marx refers to the relationship between
man and woman as a natural and essential species
(1975) , p. 299-300
®^ (1975) , p. 299.
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one can
relationship. Further, from this relationship
judge the nature of other relationships. indeed,
"one can judge man's whole level of development
mans ntl",^i.°"^t''' "^^^^^^ ^he extent tS ^hioh
Sh?ch°^h^^%H^'=™^ ^ the extent Sow ich... the other person as a person has become for
exLLncfi;'a? the'"' ^" hislndTeidSalxisTien e s t same time a social being. '°
The above passage is found in the chapter of the
Manuscripts entitled "Private Property and Communism."
This context is important for understanding Marx's second
or metatheoretical level of meaning of the concept social .
The dominant theme and subject of analysis of the
Manuscripts is alienation or estranged labor. The
leitmotif of the chapter, "Private Property and Communism"
is the supercession of alienation and private property
through communism. The conception of man as a social
being manifested as a bond or unity is elaborated as a
counter-concept in contrast to alienated relations.
In sum, Marx clearly distinguished two levels of
analysis in his discussion of human nature: in general and
as historically modified. On the general, or
metatheoretical level, Marx characterizes labor as that
which links subject and object and creates social being.
(1975) , p. 296.
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He also points to a two leveled meaning to the concepts of
sensuousness and social: each can be understood in their
human form and in alienated historical forms. indeed, in
the early Marx, alienation represents the general state of
historical being which sunders the set of general
relations described above.
I will now turn to a discussion of Marx's ontology
focusing first on these relations in general, or
metatheoretically, and then on the historical forms they
take in capitalism. As will become apparent in the final
section of this chapter, Marx's economic categories are a
systematic working out of a theory in which labor is
understood metatheoretically and historically.
Marx's Ontology
Traditionally, ontological questions have to do with
what is real, i.e., questions of being (objectivity) and
becoming (change) . Thought must attempt to reflect being
or articulate the relations between, and properties of,
things. Thus it was generally held that ontology had
priority over epistemology . Being was held to be prior to
knowledge of being.
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Marx Clearly held certain assumptions about ontology
in a philosophical sense, but was just as certainly
unconcerned with exploring the classical philosophical
questions such as the nature of being as such, or -in
itself,, or Why there is being rather than nothing. His
ontological assumptions are oriented toward answering
questions about social and historical reality. Marx's
concern was exploring the "practical relations of everyday
life between man and man and man and nature."'^
However, Marx's concerns were not completely divorced
from the more classical concerns of philosophy. The
classical metaphysical concerns, such as appearance and
reality, being and becoming, and being and consciousness,
take on a palpable social dimension. The problem of
appearance and reality becomes the problem of the equal
exchange and exploitation. The problem of becoming and
being is transformed into understanding the active
laboring subject and socially produced objectivity and, in
capitalism, the alienated labor of the subject and
alienated social product. The relation of being and
consciousness and questions of the priority of either lose
their abstractness to become the relation of alienated
(1977) , p. 173
.
social labor, socially produced objectivity and the
social origins of fetishized consciousness.
In speaking of the labor process in general,
abstracted from its specific historical form, one can
identify three aspects: 1) human activity, or labor, 2)
the material to be worked upon, and 3) the instruments of
labor. In the labor process the laborer employs the
instruments of labor, which are a complex of tools that
"serve as the conductor of his activity, "'^ to the
materials, which comprise the subject of the labor
process. The labor process is therefore primarily a
regulated interchange between man and nature. Man,
collectively and socially, appropriates objects in nature
to subject them to the labor process so that he may
produce the use values necessary for continued social
existence. Human beings, who are themselves part of
nature, oppose themselves to nature and bring to bear upon
it their own natural and historically developed
capabilities in order to appropriate material from nature
and alter to a "form adapted to (their) own wants. "'^ The
manner in which the stuff of nature, use values, enter the
production process (whether as raw materials or
92
(1977) , p. 179.
93
(1977) , p. 177
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instrument), is determined by the position it occupies,
e.g., its function in the process, when a social product
enters into a new production process it loses its social
character to become an objective material factor
"contributing to living labor. "'^
Human labor is not identifiable with the primitive,
instinctual forms of activity manifested by animal.
Rather, Marx "presuppose (s) labor in a form that stamps it
as exclusively human." what differentiates the weaver
from the spider or the architect from the bee is that
weaver and architect produce an object that they had
conceived of prior to the commencement of the labor
process. "What distinguishes the worst architect from the
best of bees is this, the architect raises his structure
in imagination before he erects it in reality." The
laborer must have a 'practical' knowledge of the material
to be worked upon such that he can transform the object
as it is given in nature to a state that is useful to him.
The blacksmith, for example, does not simply appropriate
crude iron ore and subject it blindly to a series of
random processes in hopes of coming up with a horseshoe.
Rather, he makes use of the natural mechanical, physical
and chemical properties of the iron ore in rational.
(1977) , p. 289.
purposive ways to effect a useful product. "He not only
effects a change of form in the material on which he
works, but also reali.es a purpose of his own that gives
the law to his modus operandi ... "^^
The objective factors of production must be employed
by living labor so that the use values of these elements
can be maintained otherwise they would fall "prey to the
destructive power of natural processes. iron rusts: wood
rots." But more importantly: "Living labor must seize on
these things, awaken them from the dead, change them from
merely possible into real and effective use values. "'^
Strictly speaking the labor process is an interchange
of subjective and objective aspects in which subjectivity
in the state of becoming is transformed into a state of
being. As Marx states it, labor passes "from the form of
unrest into that of being, from the form of motion into
that of objectivity."'^ Material objectivity then is
socially produced. By changing the form of a "piece of
natural material" the subject creates a use value and
labor has been objectified.
95 Here again is another restatement of the nature of
rule governed, synthetic activity. (1977), p. 178.
(1977) , p. 289.
(1977) , p. 296.
the o.^^^:^^z'^^^:^^^t^
being, as a fixed, immobile charact4rlstic!"f°''"
°'
Alienation, as expressed in the Manuscrrpts, is a
state of being which effects the totality of the subject's
relations to objects, whether the objects are the
individual's subjective nature, the products of the
subject's labor, or others' labor, or other subjects or
nature. Marx viewed this complex of relations as
internally related and thus the alienation of the subject
from any one particular aspect of being effects all other
relations. Marx indicates this when he states: "What
applies to man's relation to his work, to the product of
his labor and to himself, also holds of man's relation to
the other man, and to the other man's labor and object of
labor.
Whereas Hegel had identified objectification and
alienation, Marx separated the terms. Objectification is
(1977), p. 287. note here the clear contrast MArx
draws between labor as becoming and being, between labor as
unrest and its fixed, immobile form as being.
(1975) , p.
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an aspect of human nature and the result of activity
applied to material or nature. Alienation is a
historically determinate, distorted form of
objectification; a form which does not affirm the
subject's ontological essence. Alienation thus is a form
of objectification which results in an object that
"...becomes a power on its own confronting him."^°o
The alienation of the objects of labor result from
the social relations of capitalist appropriation and in
this form represent, for the subject, a loss of the
object. The objectification of labor then "appears as
loss of the ohi Pct and bondage to it ,ni°i That the subject
must alienate his activity, by its sale to the capitalist,
indicates the subjects alienation from self. The workers
activity becomes a means to his existence rather than an
affirmation of the subjects anthropological capability for
conscious, intentional, form-giving activity. Alienation
is then a state of social being.
100 /TOTcrx(1975) , p.
(1975), p.
102 As McMurty (1978), p. 77) argues, alienation has an
objective nature. "Alienation is not for him [Marx], as
contemporary usage mystifies it, some psychological malaise
peculiar to modern man, but a necessary material concomitant
of all private ownership of productive forces."
in sum, alienation refers to the situation that what
the laborer produces takes on an existence independent
over and against the producer's own existence and needs.
The fixation of alienated labor as a social activity
creates a force which dominates the producer. This
domination has different aspects; historical, social, and
epistemological
.
With respect to the historical dimension, the
"fixated social activity" of previous generations plays a
determinant role in the present. The alienated social
product, "thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught
our calculations is one of the chief factors in historical
development up till now."^°^ Each generation must
appropriate the productive apparatus, both material and
cultural, and must adapt itself to it and alter it through
new activity. For Marx, this is the real constraint of
history:
History IS nothing but the succession of the separate
generations, each of which uses the materials, the
capital funds, the productive forces handed down to
It by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one
hand, continues the traditional activity on
completely changed circumstances and, on the other,
modifies the old circumstances with a completely
changed activity.
103
(1976) , p. 47-8.
104
(1976) , p. 50
Earlier I noted that Marx's insight into the classic
proble. Of freedo. and deter.inis. in the philosophy of
history lies in the recognition that what .aKes subjects
into a "causally determined species" (Haberxnas- phrase)
is, ironically, a product of those subjects. The
alienated activity of past generations (of past production
cycles), active labor that was transformed from unrest,
motion or becoming into fixed material objectivity, or
being, is manifested as the force of dead labor over
living labor, or past labor over present labor.
With respect to the social dimension, Marx's analysis
of alienated labor goes beyond economic relations simply
understood to the social relations that constitute the
economic. The relations between capital and labor,
between capital, labor and commodities, and even relations
between commodities are understood as social relations.
The laborer, alienated from the means of production and
the product, working under the control of the capitalist,
finds himself in a society where social relations become
thing-like and conversely, relations between things become
like social relations.
This occurs because capitalism forces people to
relate to one another through the mediation of money and
commodities. All aspects of a person's existence are
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determined by the value of the commodities possessed and
Offered for exchange in the market. This includes their
class position, social status, standard of living,
education, ability to satisfy needs, power and frledom.
The laborer participates in society as the owner of a
commodity, labor power, which means simply that he has
property in himself and can -choose, to sell his ability
to labor. The capitalist participates as the owner of the
objective factors of production.
Lacking only the subjective aspect of the labor
process, the capitalist buys the appropriate commodity,
labor-power, in the market. For the capitalist, the
consumption of the commodity labor-power is no different
than the consumption of any other thing (raw material,
instrument) acquired in the market. As Marx states it:
From his (the capitalist) point of view, the labor
process is nothing more than the consumption of the
commodity purchased, i.e., of labor power; but he can
consume this labor power only by adding the means of
production to it. The labor process is a process
between things the capitalist has purchased, things
which belong to him.^'^
On the metatheoretical level the process is, as noted
above, a dynamic of subject and object. In speaking of
the labor process in general it was necessary only to
(1977) , p. 292
.
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delineate those factors "co..on to all for.s of society
we did not, therefore, have to present the worker in his
relationship to other workers; it was enough to present
man and his labor on one side, nature and its materials on
the other.. The historically specific conditions of
capitalist production stamps the labor process with its
own alienated forms i.e., separation from the means of
production and the necessity of selling ones labor power.
The second distinction between the historical and
metatheoretical levels in that in the former, the
capitalist labor process, the intention is to produce
surplus value, whereas on the metatheoretical level the
objective is simply to produce a use-value. Therefore, in
the capitalist labor process, labor is of concern "only in
so far as it creates value... Here we are no longer
concerned with the quality, the character and the content
of the labor, but merely with its quantity
.
Finally, alienation has epistemic consequences.
Alienated objectivity, that is being that has taken on an
existence over and against its producers, constitutes the
ontological aspect of the epistemological phenomenon of
106
(1977) , p. 290.
107
(1977) , p. 296.
fetishism. Thi«^ t r-v^^ininis, as I shall argue in the following
section, evidences a significant coherence in the
structure of Marx's theory that .ay be stated as follows:
the primary epistemological consequence of alienated labor
is fetishism and Marx's conceptual structure not only
points to this but also explains it. As Marx states it:
"The objective conditions essential to the realization of
labor are alienated from the worker and become manifest as
f^^^^''^^ endowed with a will and soul of their own.
commodities, in short, appear as the purchasers of
1 0ftpersons". i explore this issue along with the issues of
appearance and reality, science and ideology in the next
section.
Labor in Marx's EDistemolnqy
Some theorists hold that Marx's mode of thought
changed from philosophic to scientific. Indeed Althusser
once argued that there was an epistemological rupture in
Marx's work. And, as noted in Chapter I, Habermas has
argued that Marx conceived of his theory as a form of
natural science and therefore tends to resolve
(1977), p. 1003, emphasis in original.
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eplstemological issues in a positivistio manner.
Habermas, like Althusser, maintains that there is a
significant break in Marx's theoretical development.
Habermas argues that:
Marx himself immediately abandoned theanthropological model of labor as externalizationwhich still furnished the standard for ?he criMaie
'P^^i^ Manuscripts ^ and
labfr^^h^Sry'^f^alul-o?-^-^-
^--<^ing\o ih^
A result of this shift is the categorization of the
human sciences as a natural science, the point upon which
much of Habermas' interpretation rests. Marx's social
theory becomes an instrumental theory with the 'telos' of
power, manipulation and control associated with the
natural sciences.
Therefore the debate centers over what Marx meant by
science. Both orthodox Marxists and Habermas seem to have
taken the dominant cultural meaning of science and
attributed that meaning to Marx. As is common in the
debates over Marx's theory, a battle of citations has
failed to clarify the issue although those references
which tend to equate Marx's theory with the natural
sciences seem to have had greater currency than those
citations which express a more skeptical view of science.
Thompson, Held (1982), p. 255-6.
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Regrettably, in the discourse on this question, citations
are used like philosophical clubs. Orthodox Marxists
wield the Club both to legitimize their theory and to
bludgeon "petty bourgeois" Marxists and assorted idealists
for failing the test of science.
For Habermas and Charles Taylor, and anti-positivist
theorists generally, Marx's claim to be scientific is
sufficient to undermine his philosophic credibility or to
demonstrate that his theory is rent by an irreducible
conflict between romantic and scientific tendencies.
Marx's comments in the Postface to the Second Edition of
Capital are ritually trotted out to demonstrate Marx's
•scientism'. The following quote from Capital , while
directed against Proudhon, may serve as a useful comment
on this debate: "No school of thought has thrown around
the word 'science' more haphazardly than that of Proudhon,
for where thoughts are absent, words are brought in as
convenient replacements.
The controversy over science and Marx's
epistemological assumptions cannot be settled, or, if that
is impossible, our understanding advanced, without a more
general reconstruction of Marx's assumptions. A
110 (1977) , p. 161.
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determination of a position consistent with that
reconstruction can then be made.
Paralleling the structure of his ontology, Marx's
epistemology is bisected by the appearance/reality
distinction. He thus necessarily distinguishes between
science, knowledge of reality, and ideology, knowledge of
appearances. Marx is rather blunt in his description of
those he characterizes as vulgar economists or
ideologists. These economists "flounder around within the
apparent framework" of economic relations. They do not
advance the science of political economy but rather take
on the roles of popularizer and apologist. Hopelessly
caught in the realm of appearances, these economists
...seek there plausible explanations of the crudest
phenomena for the domestic purposes of the
bourgeoisie. Apart from this, the vulgar economists
confine themselves to systematizing in a pedantic
way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, the
banal and complacent notions held by the bourgeois
agents of production about their own world, which is
to them the best possible one."^
In opposition, Marx defines classical political
economy as the analysis of the "...real internal framework
of bourgeois relations of production...""^ Marx is
essentially making a distinction between ideology and
(1977) , p. 174-5, ftn. 34.
(1977), p. 174-5, ftn. 34.
science. Ideologists have as their exclusive focus a
reified objectivity. Like the unfortunates chained to the
bottom Of Plato-s cave, they see only the "semblance of
Objectivity" and "ruminate" on the relationships between
the various "social hieroglyphs" that parade before them.
Marx's epistemology is connected to his ontology in this
important sense: alienated products of labor in exchange
relations come to take on a life of their own and this
ontological situation has epistemological consequences:
fetishism. Marx points to this in the Grundrisse where he
states
:
"The bourgeois economists are so much cooped upwithin notions belonging to a specific stage ofhistorical development that the necessity of theobnectification of the powers of social labor appearsto them as inseparable from the necessity of theiralienation vis-a-vic; living labor.
Goods become commodities with all the mysterious
characteristics that come with the designation because
they are made by private individual producers who must
exchange them in the market. "It is only by being
exchanged that the products of labor acquire a socially
uniform objectivity as values, which is distinct from
their sensuously varied objectivity as articles of
(1973), p. 832. Bourgeois thought, in other words,
cannot distinguish between objectification and alienation.
utility."- The market functions to establish social
relations between things. The ever-changing value
relations between things in the .arket move "independently
of the will, fore-knowledge and actions of the
exchangers." The movement of commodities then controls
the producers rather than being controlled by them. The
form that commodities take in this context is the value
form and this form has no relation to the "physical nature
of the commodity and the material relations arising out of
this. It is nothing but the definite social relations
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the
fantastic form of a relation between things. ""^ Vulgar
political economy fails to penetrate this necessary
illusion of objectivity but instead remains bounded by it.
Fetishism is a "necessary" illusion, as opposed to a
mistake, a simple error in thought or a delusion motivated
by subjective desire, in that it results from the material
relations of production of commodities for exchange in the
market by private independent producers. Seeing through
this realm of false objectivity does not make it vanish
like a mistaken understanding when the truth is brought
out or a delusion when the impulse behind it is altered
(1977) , p. 166.
(1977) , p. 165.
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through therapy. The recognition of fetishism and the
discovery that what underlies this realm of appearances i
the "determination of the magnitude of value by labor
time" does not make this realm disappear. Rather,
acciden?ardL^^^'^^°r ^"^^ ^^^^lance of the merely
laU^t Tr ly. '''i^''^^^^'' °^ magnitude of thev lue of the products of labor, but by no meansabolishes that determination's material ?orm!""^
The recognition of the law of value, Marx states, "marks
an epoch in the history of mankind's development, but by
no means banishes the semblance of objectivity possessed
by the social characteristics of labor. ""^
In contrast to vulgar political economy, e.g.,
ideology, science is the investigation of the actual
social relations behind, or concealed within this
objectivity. Having produced this objectivity men must
then "...try to decipher the hieroglyph. .. for the
characteristic which objects of utility have of being
values is as much men's social product as is their
language. "^^^
Several important points should be noted here. First
science, as Marx employed the term, is defined in
116
(1977) ^ -Lgg.
(1977) , p. 167.
(1977) , p. 167.
opposition to ideology and within the fundamental
distinction between appearance and reality. Second,
science is not employed in a way that suggests an identity
with the natural sciences whether of a Comtist, Vienna
Circle or Popperian variety. Third, it is important to
realize that the term 'science, was employed in scientific
socialism to distinguish it from 'Utopian' socialism.
It was not employed by Marx to identify his theory with
the natural sciences. Finally, when Marx employed the
term science, its meaning was perhaps more akin to the
Hegelian nuanced term of ' wissenschaft ' . As Russel Jacoby
points out, the meaning of 'wissenschaft' is inseparable
from history, and association most all advocates of
science in its dominant meanings would have considerable
problems.
"...scientific socialism. . .was used in opposition
to Utopian socialism, which wants to attach people to new
delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledap.
of the social movement made bv the people itself ." (emphasis
added) Marx (1974), p. 337.
120 "The Hegelian wissenschaft is not wider or larger
than the positivist science; rather it is impregnated with
history. The natural reality and natural sciences do not
know the fundamental historical categories: consciousness
and self-consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity,
appearance and essence. . .As object and method, Hegel's
Wissenschaft is saturated with history; this finally
constitutes Hegel's protest against the positive and
empirical sciences." Jacoby (1981), p. 22,23.
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Second, science involves the dissolving of fixed,
objective forms of being and analyzing the social
practices that constitute those forms. Knowledge is the
understanding of the process by which labor in the form of
motion produces a fixed state of being. Knowledge of the
fixed forms of objectivity, in contrast to Plato, is
ideological and knowledge of flux, motion and activity,
that is human activity or labor, is science.
Third, there is no clear delineation between science
(the science of classical political economy) and ideology.
The practitioners of classical political economy were not
immune from the influences of fetishism. This is most
clear, Marx argues, in the failure of Smith and Ricardo to
adequately explain the value form. The value form is the
"most abstract" and "most universal form of the bourgeois
mode of production" and reveals the "historical and
transitory character" of capitalism. By beginning its
investigations "post festum" political economy mistakes
that universality as an "external natural form of social
production." Exchange value seems to be an immutable form
rather than a specific, historically conditioned result.
Put simply, political economy begins with socially
produced forms as given and natural and thus proceeds to
(1977) , pp. 168-74
.
read these forxns back into history and project the. into
the future. Fetishism flattens out the historical
dimension making it into a projection of the present.
That such profound and insightful thinkers as Smith
and Ricardo failed to penetrate the nature of value form
yet were not ideologists poses an interesting paradox:
they were seemingly both ideologists and not ideologists,
scientists and not scientists. They were not ideologists
in that their work and insight were not confined to and in
the realm of appearances, i.e., they were more than simple
apologists for the existing order. But their thought was
regulated by some principles that resulted in work that
was not completely free of ideological consequences; of
fetishism.
Scientific knowledge necessitates the resolution o
material objectivity back into the ontological relation
subjectivity and objectivity. The realm of being and
objectivity in capitalism, the alienated social product
must be understood as constituted by the realm of
becoming, that is by labor in the form of motion.
Reflection upon that objectivity begins, as noted
earlier, post festum. The results of that history are a
given and the starting point for reflection. Knowledge is
historically contingent in that it is knowledge by a
historical subject of a history that presents itself as a
set Of given, fixed congealed forms the result of past
social labor. Further, the active subject, as a thinking
conscious being, theoretically reconstructs that history.
It is clear from the above analysis that Marx's concept of
labor is designed to get at the classic philosophical
problem of the constitution of society by the subject and
the fundamental intent of Marx's theory is to abolish the
domination of capital. The realization of that intent
requires a subject that can actively investigate and
de-fetishize the 'natural- laws that apparently govern
capitalist social relations seeing through to their
underlying social constitution. Social theoretic
knowledge cannot then be acquired by subordinating thought
to objectivity.
The knowing subject does not view the historically
given conditions of his existence as brute data, "a
collection of dead facts." Rather, theory and speculation
are required both to see through false positivity and "to
facilitate the arrangement of historical material . "^^^ To
phrase it differently, the ontologically active subject
produces a material objectivity through thought governed
labor, whereas the epistemologically active subject




reflects on that objectivity, producing a scientifi
understanding through mental labor. Marx does not
an epistemologically passive subject whose thought is
simply the reflection of being. simple reflection of the
sphere of being, i.e., socially produced objectivity would
necessarily remain confined to the ideological, to
appearances. Marx not only assumes an active knowing
subject but also, as Schmidt notes, assumes the "relative
autonomy" of the cognitive subject "in [the] face of its
object and, hence, does not simply reproduce the
historical process of this object. "^^^
One further and important consequence of this
analysis of Marx's epistemological assumptions is that if
the subject is active in an epistemological sense and is
relatively autonomous, then the future development of
society is contingent on the forms of action taken, and
understanding reconstructed, by the subject. History is
not, therefore, the working out of any purely objective
tendencies or imminent ideal and is not teleological in
the broad sense of the word.
(1981) , p. 32
.
or in Marx's Fnnr.r.TT,^
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Marx's economic categories clearly exhibit the meta-
theoretical/historical distinction On the meta-
theoretical level he elaborates the concepts of labor, u
value, concrete labor. On the historical level, which i
to say from the perspective of the capitalist production
process, he elaborates the concepts of labor power,




Marx starts Capital with an analysis of commodities
which are the form in which wealth appears in capitalist
economies. The commodity can be viewed from two aspects:
quantity and quality. Viewed qualitatively, a commodity
is a use value. Its usefulness is part of the object's
natural existence, its "physical body. They constitute
the material content of wealth whatever its social form
1 25may be." In a sense, the analysis of commodities as use
values is an analysis from an ontological standpoint: its
reference is the object as a piece of nature containing
In this section the discussion is focused on the
metatheoretical/historical distinction because it is there
that Habermas' problems arise. While Marx's application of
the appearance/reality distinction in his economic
categories is brilliant, it will not be examined here.
125 (1977) ^ 126.
natural qualities. First, the creation of use values is
"an external natural necessity which mediates the
metabolism between man and nature and therefore human lif
itself. "^26 second, use values combine two elements,
material and labor, and third, use values are created by
different forms of concrete labor. The results of the
labor process in general in all historical epochs "is an
object of utility. "127 Marx's intent, however, is to
analyze capitalist relations and to dissect the forms of
appearance that capitalist production brings to these
general relations: that form being exchange value.
Exchange value appears first as a quantitative
relation that Marx describes as relative and accidental.
If two qualitatively different use values are to be put i
relationship with the other, then clearly there must be
something contained in the articles that allows an
expression of equality. Obviously that something cannot
be a physical or natural property of the article.
Exchange value implies an abstraction from these useful
qualities and natural properties in which "all its
sensuous characteristics are extinguished"^^^ In addition
(1977) , p. 133
.
(1977) , p. 153-4.
(1977) , p. 128
.
the forms of useful labor, concrete labor, are
extinguished. Setting aside consideration of use value
and concrete labor, the thing underlying the exchange
relation is that they are products of labor, "human labor
in the abstract." All social and natural qualities
disregarded, commodities have left only a "phantom-like
objectivity", a result of their being "congealed
quantities of homogeneous labor", i.e., value. "The common
factor in the exchange relation ... is therefore its value."
Furthermore, exchange value "is the necessary mode of
expression, or form of appearance, of value. "^^9
Value, therefore, arises out of the objectif ication
(or materialization) of abstract labor and the quantity of
labor is measured by time. The magnitude of value equals
socially necessary labor time which Marx defines as
"...the labor time required to produce any use value under
the conditions of production normal for a given society
and with average degree of skill and intensity of labor
prevalent in that society. "^^° The "substance" of value is
labor and the form of appearance of value in capitalism is
exchange value.
129
(1977) , p. 128
.
130
(1977) , p. 129.
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Use values acquire, or become bearers of, value
through exchange by private, independent producers. The
nexus Of exchange establishes the social relationship
between producers and products within the social division
of labor, and it is in this sense that exchange value is
constituted by underlying social relations. As Marx
states it, again clearly contrasting the two levels of
analysis: "it is only by being exchanged that the
products of labor acquire a socially uniform objectivity
as values, which is distinct from their sensuously varied
objectivity as articles of utility. "^^^ once exchange is
generalized (such that producers produce for the market)
labor acquires a two-fold social character. First, it
must be useful concrete labor, satisfy some social need
and on that basis reproduce itself as part of the social
division of labor. Second, it must become commensurate
with other forms of labor in other parts of the social
division of labor, i.e., it must become abstract labor.
Fundamentally, the equation of products through exchange
brings about the real equation of different forms of
labor. "The production of commodities must be fully
developed before the scientific conviction emerges ... that




being reduced to the quantitative proportions of which
society requires them."^^^
Commodities do not go to market under their own
power, rather they go along with someone as his or her
property. For commodities and their owners to enter into
relationships with each other their owners must enter into
a juridical relation. Commodities, as things, are in
principle alienable. For exchange to occur it is
necessary that each person treat others as 1) "the private
owners of those alienable things" and 2) as persons who
are independent of each other." Marx characterizes this
relation as "reciprocal isolation and foreignness"^^^ and
as "atomistic"^^^ and fixes this form of relation as
historically specific to the capitalist mode of
production. The people who enter into these relations
play particular social roles which are conditioned by
economic relations, i.e. they are not simply free, equal,
legal owners but they are also capitalists or workers.
Furthermore, for goods to appear in the market they
must not be use values for their owner and they must be
(1977) , P. 168.






use values for their purchaser. They must be exchanged t
be realized as use values and must be effective use val
before they are exchanged. Exchange will determine
whether the concrete labor expended was indeed useful
labor.
Money, Marx argues, is a necessary precipitate of the
regular exchange process: it "crystallizes out of exchange
because of the necessity of a universal equivalent."
Utopian visions of commodity exchange without the 'evil'
of money are, Marx argues, foolish but understandable.
They are foolish because to get rid of money while leaving
commodity production untouched is like abolishing "the
pope while leaving Catholicism in existence . "^^^ Catholics
and capitalists would have to reinvent the pope and money
respectively.
Marx explained the riddle of the commodity and
money fetishes as objectively necessary illusions. To the
participants in the marketplace, the exchange process
appears as natural and inevitable, i.e., as a fetish. In
that money grows out of the exchange process and acquires
the appearance of having an intrinsic value, it acquires
an almost super natural appearance to the participants.
(1977) , P. 181.
104
a
in fact the money fetish is a fetish built upon a prior
fetish: a sort of fetish squared. Ultimately the super
natural qualities of »oney, whether viewed as good by the
capitalists or evil by the social reformers, are part of
socially produced illusion that arises necessarily out of
the regularized exchange process."' Out of the universal
exchange process, or the circulation of money and
commodities
,
...there develops a whole network of socialconnections of natural origin, entirely beyond thecontrol of human agents. Only because the farmer hassold his wheat is the weaver able to sell his linenonly because the weaver has sold his linen is our
'
rash and intemperate friend able to sell his Bibleand only because the latter already has the water ofeverlasting life is the distiller able to sell his
eau-de-vie. And so it goes on.'"^^
On the face of it, the capitalist goes to market,
spends money on those items needed for production, leaves
the market, goods in hand, returns to his factory and
produces a commodity which he then brings back to the
market and, with luck, sells for a value greater than that
spent in his original purchase. "M-C-M^ is in fact
therefore the general formula for capital, in the form in




(1977) , p. 187
.
(1977) , p. 207-8
.
(1977) , p. 257
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The problem as summarized in Chapter V of CaEital is: how
can a surplus (m') arise from the exchange of equivalents.
"Circulation... creates no value""' and certainly no
surplus value.
Marx argues that this incipient capitalist must have
found something in the first exchange (M-C) that
subsequently allows him to realize a surplus. since
equivalents are exchanged for equivalents in the market,
the surplus cannot arise out of exchange. The capitalist
is fortunate enough to acquire in the market a commodity
whose use value is greater than its exchange value: labor
power. Marx defines labor power as follows:
We mean by labor power, or labor capacity, the
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities
existing on the physical form, the living
personality, of a human being, capabilities which he
sets in motion whenever he produces a use value of
any kind.
As was pointed out above, labor or activity is a
central term in Marx's definition of human nature and his
explanation on the metatheoretical level of the
constitution of the social and historical world. It is
also indubitably a perpetual necessity for the production
of the wealth (use values) necessary for continued social
139
(1977) , p. 266
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(1977) , p. 270.
existence. Labor power is introduced to distinguish the
form labor takes in capitalist production from its
metatheoretical determinants. Put simply there has always
been labor. But special historical conditions must obtain
for there to appear in the market labor for sale and thus
labor with an exchange value. The aforementioned
juridical relations must be in effect so that a person has
an inalienable right to property in his person, i.e., he
must have a legal self that is continuous with but
separate from his physical identity. The worker must be
free to sell or alienate his physical and mental
capacities for a contractually delineated period of time.
Further, the worker must be free to continuously enter
into such contracts in the market. Most importantly, the
worker must have no other commodities to bring to market
and must lack the materials and instruments necessary for
production.
...this worker must be free in the double sense that
as a free individual he can dispose of his labor
power as his own commodity, and... he has no other
commodity for sale, i.e., he is rid of them, he is
free of all the objects needed for the realization of
his labor power.
^
In case it was not sufficiently clear that labor power is
a historically specific concept Marx states:
...nature does not produce on the one hand owners of
money and commodities, and on the other hand men
possessing nothing but their labor power. This
^""^
(1977) , p. 272-3
relation has no basis in natural history
hiltory!"" "^^^^ ^° P«ri°d^
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nor does it
o s of human
The capitalist historical epoch is distinguished by
the appearance (out of the dissolution of feudal ties) of
labor power and that "in the eyes of the worker himself
(labor power) takes on the form of a commodity which is
his property.....1^3 when this point has been reached
(labor having an exchange value) the commodity form has
become universal.
The capitalist, Marx argues, is fortunate to have
found the one commodity, which, as noted above, has an
exchange value which is less than the value it can
produce. "Therefore the value of labor power, and the
value which that labor power valorizes, are two entirely
different magnitudes; and this difference was what the
capitalist had in mind when he was purchasing the labor
power.
"
Things look, and are, very different in the
capitalist production process. What, from the perspective
of the labor process in general, is a dynamic of subject
1^2 (1977) ^ 273.
1^3 (1977) ^ 274.
(1977) , p. 300.
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and object becomes, from the perspective of the
valorization process, a functional relation of things.
From the latter perspective, labor power, means of
production, and raw material become forms of existence
that are taken on by capital advanced in its monetary
form. Marx introduces two terms to refer to these social
forms of existence in the valorization process: constant
and variable capital. Constant capital is defined by the
condition that its value is not increased or decreased in
the production process and is "turned into means of
production; the raw material, the auxiliary material and
the instruments of labor... "^^^ Variable capital is that
part of capital advanced that undergoes an alteration in
value during production. "it both reproduces the
equivalent of its own value and produces an excess,
surplus-value, which may itself vary, and be more or less
according to circumstances. "^^"^
On the metatheoretical level, the objective factors
of production take the form of constant capital and the
subjective factors take the form of variable capital.
Marx is quite clear that constant and variable capital are
particular historical forms of appearance of the
145
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(1977) , p. 317
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meatatheoretical concepts of objective and subjective
factors of production.
view^ofthi^T^f^ ^^P^^^' the point ofw of e labor process, can be distinquishedrespectively as the objective and subjective factorsas means of production and labor power, can be
'
distinguished, from the point of view of the
capital!^^^""'
process, as constant and variable
If what counts, from the perspective of producing use
values, is concrete labor and the qualities of the object,
then from the perspective of producing surplus value what
counts is abstract labor and quantity. Abstract labor is
pre-eminently a social and historical category. More
accurately, it has as a referent the form labor takes when
subsumed by capital. The reality of capitalist production
manifests itself as a tendency towards the reproduction of
labor as abstract labor.
What counts for the capitalist is quantity,
specifically a quantity of labor power measured by time.
"...Labor does not count as productive activity with a
specific utility, but simply as value-creating substance,
as social labor in general which is in the act of
objectifying itself and whose sole feature of interest is
its quantities . Marx continually stresses that time
(1977) , p. 317
.
(1977) , p. 1012
.
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(duration) is the crucial factor. m order to produce
surplus value, the capitalist is compelled to use labor
power for a period of time in excess of the time necessary
to produce value equal to the variable capital advanced.
The capitalist advances variable capital with the intent
of extracting surplus labor time. On average it matters
not who is employed, i.e., that a particular laborer can
perform specific kinds of skilled, concrete, heterogeneous
labor, only that the laborer work the full day. As Marx
puts it in the Poverty of Philosophy, "we should not say
that one man's hour is worth another mans hour, but that
one man during an hour is worth just as much as another
man during an hour. Time is everything, man is nothing: he
is at most time's carcass
.
Since abstract labor has been so widely misconstrued
some clarifications are in order. First, it is not, as
Colleti correctly notes, a simple theoretical
• 1 50abstraction. Rather, as a concept it refers to an
actual process of equating of different labors through




(1972), p. 84.". .. 'abstract labor' is... far from
being a mere mental abstraction of the investigator's", but
rather "...is one which takes place daily in the reality of
exchange itself .
"
the particularly capitalist mode of producing relative
surplus value.
Ill
A second, and related issue, is that abstract labor
is not an ontological or metatheoretical category. it is
not, in other words, the type of abstraction which is
valid for an analysis of production in all historical
epochs. Most recently, for example, Diane Elson has
argued that abstract labor applies to all historical
epochs and is a "valid abstraction" (of the type Marx
employs) that fixes a common element in all modes of
production. it is incumbent on those advancing such a
position to demonstrate the existence of abstract labor
in, for instance, the feudal mode of production. The
peasant, while producing on his own time for his immediate
needs, is clearly engaged in concrete labor, i.e., the
production of use values, without any involvement in an
exchange network. His labor is concrete, heterogeneous,
and structured by the needs of the family and the specific
obligations to provide specific quantities of use values
to the lord, or surplus labor. Surplus labor can, of
course, be measured by time, but that would be
insufficient to justify the inclusion of compulsory labor
in the category of abstract labor. More to the point is
whether one serf's labor time could be treated as the
equivalent of another serf's labor time from the
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perspective of the lord. That is, would it make any
difference if serf A's labor were replaced by serf B's
labor? on one level the answer is it makes no difference
because one serf can probably repair as many yards of road
as another. But it makes all the difference whether the
serf prescriptively obligated to perform the labor
actually performs it.
The feudal system is structured by relations of
personal dependence based on prescriptive rights, duties,
and obligations that are particular to not simply the
occupant of a social role but to specific individuals.
Ultimately, a lord's failure to enforce specific
obligations due could result in those obligations being
voided. To allow the interchangeability of labor would
threaten the core of the feudal mode of domination. ""^^
In the final analysis, the difference between
feudalism and capitalism lies in essentially incomparable
modes of domination, or to use Marx's terms, supremacy and
subordination. The difference lies in the manner by which
More related objections can be raised. The serf's
obligated labor time does not result in the production of
commodities, i.e., the lord is not a capitalist. He may
sell some of his surplus to acquire money to purchase luxury
goods and contribute thereby to the development of
capitalism but he does not exploit the different magnitudes
of the exchange and use-value of labor power.
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surplus labor is appropriated: "...the method by which
surplus labor is extorted." Marx notes two relationships
that formally distinguish the subsumption of labor under
capital. The first is: "The pure money relationship
between the man who appropriates the surplus labor and the
man who yields it up..."^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
(legal) equals and both are free and unencumbered by any
prior or underlying constraints whether social, political
or religious. As against the feudal mode of production,
what brings the seller of labor power into a position of
dependency "is solely the fact that the buyer is the owner
of conditions of labor"^" What is decisive here, Marx
repeatedly emphasizes, is that the mode of domination
changes its form. "If supremacy and subordination come to
take the place of slavery, serfdom, vassallage and other
patriarchal forms of subjection, the change is purely one
of form. The form becomes freer, because it is objective
in nature, voluntary in appearance, purelv economic . "^^^
The second distinction is that the objective factors
of production and the means of subsistence confront the
(1973) , p. 1025.
(1973) , p. 1025.
(1973) , p. 1028
.
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worker as capital, or as "alien property."^" These
essentially legal conditions formally establish the
relations of capitalist to worker, i.e., capital to wage
labor,
Again, labor, when subsumed under capital, becomes an
"instrument of the valorization process . "^^^ In the labor
process in general the subjective conditions of
production, labor, utilizes the objective conditions.
Capitalism inverts the metatheoretical relation between
person and thing, person and nature, subject and object.
Thus: " Capital utilizes the worker, the worker does not
utilize capital, and only articles which utilize the
worker and hence possess independence
, a consciousness and
a will of their own in the capitalist, are capital . "^^^ In
keeping with the discussion of fetishism above Marx
further notes that this inversion "has become an
inseparable part of the physical character of the elements
of production both in capitalist production itself and in
the imagination of the economists." So much so, in fact,
that when Ricardo "...deems it necessary to give an
lysis of the physical elements of capital, he naturallyana
(1973) , p. 1026.
(1973) , p. 1019
.
(1973) , p. 1008
without scruples or reflection of any kind .akes use of
the correct economic expressions
. Marx continues by
noting that Ricardo understands that capital is something
that employs labor, not the opposite.
This is indeed the central point with regard to
Habermas- analysis of Marx's concept of labor. The issue
may be stated as follows: Habermas- claim is that Marx
holds that labor is instrumental, by its nature, a thing
to be utilized in a rational, efficient way. I have
sought to demonstrate by the above exegesis that Marx's
analysis shows how labor becomes an instrument when
subsumed by capital.
We have been discussing the "formal" subsumption of
labor under capital. That is to say the two conditions
elaborated above represent the necessary pre-conditions o
capitalist production. When these conditions obtain, the
specifically economic relations of domination of the
capitalist mode of production, capital over wage labor,
are effective. These conditions may obtain regardless of
the technology of the production process. In other
words, a guild master may become a capitalist without
altering the traditional technical production process
(1973) , p. 1008, ftn. 18.
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although certainly the social relations of production will
be altered. All things remaining the same, the guild
master turned capitalist will generate surplus value
through the mechanism of absolute surplus value, i.e., the
lengthening of the working day beyond the time necessary
to produce a quantity of commodities of value equal to the
variable capital advanced. However, when this new
capitalist revolutionizes the mode of production through
the application of the social forces of production
(science and technology) to the labor process, he
initiates what Marx refers to as the "real" subsumption of
labor under capital. "The real subsumption of labor under
capital is developed in all the forms evolved by relative,
as opposed to absolute surplus value. "^^'
The capitalist now increases surplus value by
shortening the period of necessary labor time rather than
by lengthening the period of surplus labor time. With
this development "... capitalist production now establishes
itself as a mode of production sui generis and brings into
being a new mode of material production." It is crucial
to note here that this new form of large scale manufacture
presupposes the direct application of science and
technology. The penetration or transformation of old
(1973) , p. 1035.
117
production process occurs on a scale that "beggar(s)
comparison" with precapitalist and early capitalist
production. Individual capital becomes social capital,
and this tendency manifests itself in a drive to take
over all spheres of industry "where only formal
subsumption obtains. "^^°
Marx's view of the relation of science to industry is
important given the logic of Habermas' analysis. The
development of the process of relative surplus value
necessarily entails revolutionizing the means of
production. The impetus for this is inherent in the
nature of the constraints on the capitalist. The desire
to increase surplus value through absolute surplus value
reaches certain natural limits in the length of the
working day: the laborer must have some time to reproduce
his labor power. The capitalist, unless he is also an
inventor, scientist, and engineer and thereby capable of
revolutionizing the means of production through his own
efforts, must rely on the general socialized knowledge of
the sciences and bring that knowledge to bear on the
problems of increasing the scale of production thereby
reducing necessary labor time. The capitalist's desire to
do so will be greatly enhanced when he realizes that such
(1973) , p. 1035-6.
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techniques could lead to super profits vis-a-vi.
producers using older techniques.
s other
Although they are lengthy, Marx's comments on this
topic are worth quoting in their entirety.
The social productive forces of labor, or theproductive forces of directly social^ ' sociaUzed
co;p;ra?lir^H""' bein^II^^^o eration, division of labor within the workshopthe use of machinery, and in general the
^^r^^?""""^^^""
°^ production by the conscious use ofthe sciences, or mechanics, chemistry, etc forspecific ends, technology, etc. and similarly
^o^^^lfH S
increase of scale correspondingt such developments (for it is only socialized laborthat IS capable of applying the general poducts ofhuman development, such as mathematics, o theimmediate processes of production; and converselyprogress m these sciences presupposes a certainlevel of material production) . This ntire
development of productive forces of socialized labor(in contrast to the more or less isolated labor ofindividuals)
,
and together with it the use of science(the general product of social development) , in the
immediate process of production
, takes the form of
productive power of capital . it does not appear
as the productive power of labor, or even of that
part of it that is identical with capital. And least
of all does it appear as the productive power either
of the individual worker or of the workers joined
together in the process of production. The
mystification implicit in the relations of capital as
a whole is greatly intensified here, far beyond the
point it had reached or could have reached in the
merely formal subsumption of labor under capital. On
the other hand, we here find a striking illustration
of the historic significance of capitalist production
in its specific form—the transmutation of the
immediate process of production itself and the
development of social forces of production of
labor.
(1977) , p. 1024
.
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in early capitalist production, the relation of
science to industry was sporadic, un-coordinated,
nonsystematic. with the real subsu.ption of lablr through
relative surplus value, Marx emphasizes that science is
consciously used, and brought into systematic relation
with industry. Further the mystification that inheres in
capital acquires an additional dimension: science then
participates in fetishism inasmuch as its application to
production and ultimately its further development appears
as (and indeed is) a function of the needs of capital.
Marx elaborates further on the relation of science
and industry in the Grundrisse and carries the logic of
the analysis one step further.^" There he notes that an
automatic system of machinery represents the most adequate
form of capitalist development. At this stage there are
some interesting implications. First, workers serve as
"conscious linkages" and function primarily as
superintendents. The machine, which possesses accumulated
social knowledge and skill, is no longer the means that
labor employs i.e. it does not transmit the laborers'
activity to the raw material. Second, the machine then
appears to act purposively, not labor, and the machine is
thus the producer of use values. Labor becomes "a mere
(1973) , p. 690-712.
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abstraction of activity," that activity being governed by
the requirements of the automatic system. And, as Marx
notes in the paragraph reproduced above, science becomes
an alien force due to the separation of mental and manual
labor. "The science which compels the inanimate limbs of
the machinery, by the construction, to act purposefully,
as an automaton, does not exist in the worker's
consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the
machine as an alien power." Third, when capital reaches
this stage of development, Marx presciently notes that
science itself becomes an industry.'" Ultimately "living
labor (is) subsumed under self-activating objectified
labor." Being, in other words, subsumes becoming.
Marx goes on to note that the reduction of necessary
labor time through the mechanism of relative surplus value
"...will redound to the benefit of emancipated labor, and
is the condition of its emancipation. "^^^ He also argues
that through this process capitalism, and value theory, is
undermined. Surplus value derives from the appropriation
of labor time. "But," in Marx's words,
to the degree that large industry develops, the
creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labor
time and on the amount of labor employed than on the
(1973) , p. 704.
(1973) , p. 695
(1973, p. 701.
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Hq^kv,^! i^'-itiiioe ana on the procrress of
prodSS>°^ application of th?s Ll^ncfto
Marx then draws out the logical implication: labor
time "must cease to be" the measure of wealth and exchange
value of use value. The whole system of production for
exchange value is undermined by the very processes which
it brought into existence. Capital, which turned both
subject and object into "mere means" for the production of
surplus value, makes the production of wealth, quite
unintentionally, "independent (relatively) of the
labor-time employed on it."^^^ Here again value theory
has historical limits. Here, the logic of Marx's
argument, in a sort of closure, suggestively speculates on
the dissolution of the social relations that, through
their own historical dynamic, brought the logic of the
domination of value into being.
166
(1973) , p. 705.
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(1973) , p. 706.
ConclllRi nn
122
In the foregoing I have first stressed the
fundamental importance of the appearance/reality
distinction and metatheoretical and historical levels of
analysis in structuring Marx's theoretical assumptions.
Second, I have suggested that Marx's ontological,
anthropological, epistemological
, and economic assumptions
and analysis are fundamentally coherent. Third, I have
argued that the concept of labor has differing 'functions'
and levels of meaning in the various spheres of analysis.
Fourth, I have argued that the concept of labor is
theoretically central in the philosophic sense that a
materialist social theory must proceed on the basic
insight that labor in the form of motion (becoming)
creates the fixed forms of objectivity (being).
On this basis I will argue, in the concluding
chapter, that Habermas' understanding of Marx's concept of
labor is severely restricted and fundamentally inadequate.
This has consequences for Habermas' subsequent claim that
Marx lacked a normative basis sufficient to sustain his
critique of capitalism.
While sympathetic to Habermas' desire to link
epistemological and anthropological issues and place them
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on a new footing and, while agreeing substantially with
the claim that "Marxism" (as a legitimating ideology)
resolves these issues in a positivistic manner, I will
argue that Marx does not so resolve these issues and in
fact holds certain counter-factual normative assumptions
arguably sufficient to his critique and, importantly and
ironically, virtually identical to those derived by




Habermas- analysis of Marx, linked as it is with a
broad range of issues, is extraordinarily complex and
ambitious. As we have seen, his central claim is that
Marx understood labor to be exclusively instrumental
activity. And again, as I have noted above, the
conseguences for Marx's theory are manifold. Marxian
theory 1) is a form of positivism as it models itself
after the natural sciences; 2) reduces all spheres of
human activity to instrumental activity specifically
reducing communication and interaction to labor; 3) is at
best ambiguous with regard to epistemology , that is while
it claims to contain an interest in emancipation it
reduces knowledge to the instrumental.
After a brief summary of the analysis of Marx in
Chapter II, I will discuss the possible justification of
the metatheoretical level of analysis. The guestion is:
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just what constitutes a rational abstraction, and
conversely, what constitutes a bad abstraction? i will
then turn to the central question of this work: can
Habermas. analysis of Marx's concept of labor be sustained
on the basis of the evidence brought to bear through the
reconstruction of Marx above.
The final two parts of this chapter will examine the
implications for the question of the normative foundations
of critical theory. The most important implication of
Habermas- line of analysis, and the implication which
animates both Habermas • theoretical project and
considerable controversy in contemporary political theory,
is the related claim that Marx lacked a normative
foundation adequate to his critique of capitalism. I will
examine the implications of this critique of Habermas for
this issue of normative foundations and discuss the norms
Marx employed to ground his critique.
Marx clearly makes metatheoretical assumptions about
human nature and justifies these as necessary and rational
abstractions. Most important for the evaluation of
Habermas' position is the notion of the subject as an
active (laboring) being. Marx defines humans as active,
natural, objective, social, sensuous and conscious beings.
Activity, or labor, is 1) capable of objectification, 2)
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mediates subject and obiect i-r-=.r,c-Pujjj cT:, J) transformative (in that it
"makes over" its nh^or-l-^ a\ • -,r Object), 4) social, 5) rule governed, and
6) is of both mind and body. Regarding the last point,
activity, on this level, is not simply the brute
expenditure of energy. Activity also refers to mental
activity.
On the ontological level, Marx places the active
subject in a complex of relations that connect the subject
to nature (both internal and external), socially produced
objectivity and others. Labor serves to mediate these
relations. Put philosophically, becoming (labor in the
form of motion)
,
through the rule governed appropriation
of nature (internal and external) produces being (the
objectivity and fixity of objects and social relations).
On the epistemological level, Marx makes one
assumption that is crucial for our purposes: the subject
is epistemologically active. This again is consistent
with Marx's descriptions of consciousness (as in the
Manuscripts when talking of human nature) and labor as
thought governed, conscious, intentional and form giving
activity (as in Capital when talking of the labor process
in general) . Furthermore, it is consistent with the
position that it must be an active thinking subject that
demystifies social reality by working through
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theoretically the objectively necessary form of
appearance, or illusions, created by capitalist
production. For this is the only basis on which the
domination of labor by capital can be overcome.
Marx's economic theory, on the metatheoretical level,
points up the relations between the subjective factor
(labor) and the objective factors (tools and material) of
production abstracted from any particular social
formation. Labor is here concrete, heterogeneous, rule
governed, lacks any separation of design and execution or
mental and manual labor, is connected to subjective needs
and constitutes social relations for that purpose and for
social reproduction, and transforms its own nature in the
process. This continuous process of making and re-making
the objectivity of things and social relations throughout
time is history and thus the dynamic of history is the
activity of the subject. History is labor in the form of
motion or becoming as it is constrained by the material
objectivity of past labor.
If the concept of labor is to be adequate to the
theoretical task of linking anthropology, ontology,
epistemology, history and economics, then it must
necessarily be construed broadly enough 1) to cover the
range of modes of human social expression from economics
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(work), art, religion, science, the family, politics,
love, and language and 2) be capable of definition on both
the metatheoretical and historical levels of analysis. a
.etatheoretical level of analysis requires a broad concept
Of labor While the historical level requires a concept
that specifies concrete social relations. Marx claimed
that social activity is made up of three aspects,
production, family, and consciousness, all of which are
the result of the constituting activity of subjects.
Hence it is that Habermas- claim that Marx's concept of
labor applies only to the economic level and is
exclusively instrumental is not adequate to either Marx's
writings or the logical structure of Marx's theory, at
least, thus far in our analysis on the metatheoretical
level
.
Let us now turn to Marx's historical level analysis.
With the rise of capitalist social relations, the
structured relations described above still obtain but
assume alienated and fetishized forms. The subject's
activity becomes something that must be sold on the
market: thus, alienation from one's self through the sale
Of labor-power. The subject becomes alienated from the
social product through the imposition of capitalist
property relations. External nature and the social
product become a material objectivity that confronts the
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subject as an uncontrollable force. The subject's
potential sociality beco.es restricted by a legal syste.
Of individual rights, private property, and economic
competition leaving only the impoverished, atomistic and
utilitarian social world of Bentham. Finally, the subject
must come to embody a mind/body duality, for not only is
mental and manual labor split into different spheres of
the division of labor, but the subject must hold to a
conscious identity as a free being while not having the
freedom to not sell his activity, or labor-power, to the
capitalist. The subject necessarily comes to see the body
as a thing to be utilized by capital. Capitalist
relations demand that the subject maintain the mental
identity of a free subject and a physical identity that is
instrumental
.
The set of ontological relations are similarly
structured in a contradictory manner in capitalism. The
subject produces an objectivity that controls rather than
being controlled by the subject. The social relations
that arise out of the social organization of labor become
subsumed under capital and take the commodity form. This
reacts back upon the subject's consciousness in the form
of fetishes that arise out of alienated and rigidified
social and productive relations.
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Epistemologically, while the active subject
constitutes the universe of objects and relations and the
forms (language etc.) through which these are known, these
forms are objectively necessary illusions: appearances.
The domination of capital over labor (being over becoming)
creates rigidified forms of conscious understandings that
are ideological and hence that functionally obscure the
subject's knowledge of history and the real process of the
constitution of society by labor.
With the labor process subsumed by capital, concrete
labor becomes abstract labor, heterogeneous labor becomes
homogeneous, labor becomes a commodity and the subject's
attributes become the capitalist's, production is for
exchange and the production of wealth becomes the
extraction of a surplus through exploitation. Marx's
theory is a historical explanation of the appearance of
labor as a commodity and all the implications that this
appearance has for social theory. He attempted to capture
these implication in the economic concepts he elaborates
as the labor theory of value. Because Marx's theory
operates on both the historical and metatheoretical level
and with an appearance/reality distinction it can hardly
be correct to claim that he treated labor as purely
instrumental activity.
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Rational Ahstrnrtlon anri Theory in ^^n^.-.i
Marx never systematically and explicitly discussed
the justification of the metatheoretical conceptual
structure. There are, however, enough textual clues to
make a theoretical reconstruction possible. Thus we can
reconstruct arguments for the validity of metatheoretical
concepts; arguments that are consistent with those Marx
used.
For example, Marx argues that it is proper to
abstract from specific historical forms of production and
to speak of production in general He deems this a
"rational abstraction" because it delineates those
relations common to all forms of production. Because Marx
said so little on this subject, I will quote him at
length.
Production in general is an abstraction, but a
rational abstraction in so far as it really brings
out and fixes the common element and saves us
repetition. Still, this general category, this
common element sifted out by comparison, is itself
segmented many times over and splits into different
determinations. Some determinations belong to all
epochs, others to only a few. [Some]
determinations will be shared by the most modern
epoch and the most ancient ... There are
characteristics which all stages of production have
in common, and which are established as general ones
of the mind: but so-called general preconditions of
(1973) , p. 85.
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llLllTTtr^^ni Trill Mst ^'^-.^•^-^ -^^tractproduction can be grasped"^" ^'"^^ ^^""^^ °^
In Capital, Marx again discusses the abstract
elements of the labor process.
inte?actLn"bIt5^^^
condition for the metabolic
nat -I pL^n:-,?irS? ^L^^'t^'^
society in which human beings liveJ^°
Marx always notes in these passages that, as abstractions,
these concepts do not provide knowledge of particular
things or relationships, in fact remain empty until
brought to bear on historical material. Marx goes on to
note
:
The taste of porridge does not tell us who grew theoats, and the process we have presented does notreveal the conditions under which it takes placewhether It is happening under the slave-owner's
'
brutal lash or the anxious eye of the capitalist,whether Cincinnatus undertakes it in tilling hiscouple of acres, or a savage, when he lays low a wildbeast with a stone"^^
If what characterizes a rational abstraction is that
it fixes certain determinations of labor or the subjects
that are common, universal and necessary (in the sense of
indispensable to the practice of social theory) , the
(1973) , p. 85, 88.
(1977) , p. 290.
(1977) , p. 290.
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question arises: what characterizes a "bad" abstraction?
Marx offers two examples of bad abstractions.
The first Marx calls a process of forgetting. He
argues that one must take care not to confuse those
particular determinations which have developmental
significance with those that are common and universal.
This can lead, as we shall see, to fundamentally
ideological conclusions. Capital, which obviously has had
the profoundest developmental impact on society, is not,
Marx argues, a valid abstraction. Marx criticizes
political economy precisely for the error of seeing
capital as a valid abstraction. His argument is as
follows: all will agree no production can take place
without an instrument, which is nothing but stored up
labor. Capital, which is an instrument of production, is
also objectified labor. "Therefore capital is a general,
eternal relation of nature; that is, if l leave out just
the specific quality which alone makes 'instrument of
production' and • stored-up labor' into capital. "^^^ In
such a view the stone flung by the savage at a wild beast
is capital.'"'^ The forgetting Marx refers to is blindness
(1973), p. 86.
^'^ "By a wonderful feat of logical acumen. Colonel
Torrens has discovered, in this stone of the savage, the
origin of capital." (1977), p. 291.
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that results tro. using the process of abstracting as a
fxlter. This type of bad abstraction is essentially a
fonu Of reification involving historical amnesia and has
the ideological result of concealing the historical and
social relations that determine what form the instrument
takes. As Marx puts it, "The whole profundity of those
modern economists who demonstrate the eternity and
harmoniousness of the existing social relations lies in
this forgetting. "^^^
The second type of bad abstraction Marx notes are
those abstractions which are chaotic or too indeterminant.
It may seem scientifically correct to begin investigation
"with the real and concrete. . .with eg the population,
which is the foundation and the subject of the entire
social act of production." Upon reflection, however,
population proves to be an empty concept of the whole.
"The population is an abstraction if I leave out... the
classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn
are an empty phrase if i am not familiar with the elements
on which they rest. E.g. wage labor, capital, etc."^^^
The journey would have to continue until we discover the
determinants of wage labor and capital, such as exchange
(1973) , p. 85.
^''^
(1973) , p. 100.
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value, labor power, division of labor and property for
example. Population proves to be only an apparently
concrete point of departure.
Furthermore, we should note that Marx considers th.
abstraction 'labor- as an historical result. while he
notes that the conception of "labor as such" is of ancient
origins, as an economic conception its origins are in
modern, capitalist productive relations. if one examines
the history of economic thought one finds wealth variously
attributed to, in different historical periods, money and
land. With Smith, and modern political economy the source
of wealth is seen as labor, in "subjective activity." As
Marx puts it: "As a rule, the most general abstractions
arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete
development, where one thing appears as common to many, to
all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form
alone. "^^^ The abstraction "labor" is thus not simply the
result of thought, but also of the concrete relations of
labor and production in capitalism which are in fact the
practical basis for the validity of this abstraction.
"Not only the category, labor, but labor in reality has
here become the means of creating wealth in general, and
(1973) , p. 104.
has ceased to be organically linked with particular
individuals in any specific form."
There is one further type of abstraction, or more
properly, process of abstraction, that Marx criticizes:
that is the method of speculative idealism that he
critiques in Th^Holy_Famil^
. m a brief section on the
"absolute fruit" Marx parodies the method of German
Idealism, which appears profound and mystifying when the
subject is Geist, by bringing the method to bear on a more
mundane subject. One apparent contradiction should be
kept in mind at this point. Though Marx does not recommend
this procedure as a mode of philosophic reasoning, and
indeed finds it absurd when it is brought down to earth.
Yet, Marx seems to reproduce this mode of speculative
abstraction in the opening sections of Capital .
In order to clarify this point, let us look at the
specifics of these arguments. The following, Marx argues,
is the method of speculative idealism. First the
philosopher contemplates a collection of objects, in this
case, particular fruits. From this he concludes that the
abstraction "fruit" is valid. He then comes to think of
the abstraction "fruit" as something that exists
independently of himself and the particular fruits. He
then thinks that the abstraction "fruit", real and
independent as it is, fo^s the "substance" of real
particular fruits which are only semblances of the
substance. Next, he begins to wonder how it is that the
"absolute fruit" manifests itself in the forms of
particular fruits, i.e., how apples are the instantiation
of the "absolute fruit." The speculative philosopher sees
in every particular fruit
Pru?i-^"°S''"^*'°^ substance, of the Absolute
Is"io-di^lSeir*?l l^ft^'i^^^'^ specSi^^Ln
fruits Which have a'h^^f.^I^i^^.^^f-i.^^^^-
not out':? ?hrmar^'°f
^"^^ ^^""^ °' Your lrlTu kn^
thl abst?fction ^hf'^^
earth... when you return from
mind "the FrS?;" ^ '^"P^rnatural . creation of the
on"?Ae^tL^rftAe^na^rril^f^i---,ire
abltrfct^Sns.""? sh^^rr'""^
The parallel between this critique of speculative
idealism and the logic of Marx's argument in the beginning
of Capital is interesting. Marx seems to employ the same
logic that he ridiculed in The Holv FamUy
. To draw out
this parallel let us imagine, instead of a philosopher, a
political economist. Instead of fruit, let us imagine the
economist in contemplating different labor processes such
as spinning, weaving, tailoring, smithing, etc. We know
these to be different forms of concrete labor but our






. Let us suppose that he begins taki
the same logical steps as the philosopher, i.e., he
concludes that -labor' exists independently of the actual
subjects performing the concrete labor and that what is
important is not labor in its concrete form but the
abstraction labor. The concrete labor he began with now
becomes the particular manifestation of abstract labor,
spinning, weaving, tailoring, and smithing become
instanciations of abstract labor which becomes the
substance of value. Actual labor becomes abstract and
acquires supernatural significance in the labor theory of
value. Now if this mode of thinking is silly when
employed by the Left Hegelians what makes it valid for the
political economist?
Part of the answer to this question has already been
provided above in Chapter II. That is, the social
relations of capitalist production make labor abstract.
Exchange relations make different, particular forms of
human activity equivalent by bringing them into relation
in the market and constituting their value. What is
involved here are actual social practices of production
and exchange—real social relations. While an orange can
never become the instanciation of the absolute
fruit, labor in its concrete form labor can, when subsumed
by capital, become the instanciation of abstract labor.
Marx ™akes this point in an oft overlooked passage in
Capital .
produSe^s o? coat;':'^"?' '
thelLs, whL the
in?o a relation ? ^^^^^ ^^^^^ commodities
(and klt'll^Ts no difference^ii^^er'as^?^
^'^^^^
l^b'^^'T;.""^ -latio^beteeertkirown^r^^^abor and the collective labor of society appears tothem m exactly this absurd formJ^«
coats, boots, and linen, as real objects, are no more
equivalent than oranges and apples, but real social
relations can make all of these objects stand in
relationship to each other and give them an exchange
value.
This line of reasoning can provide a clue to what
Marx meant when referring to the rational element of the
Hegelian dialectic. In this respect, the hidden validity
of Hegel's logic is that it accurately captures the
objective insanity of capitalist relations. The insanity
of capitalist relations became the hidden core of Hegel's
philosophical method. As philosophical method it is
problematic, but as philosophic insight into the human
condition in the modern world it is insightful. Hegel's
mistake, as Marx viewed it, was to elevate and transform
the logic of capitalist social reality into the logic of
(1977) , p. 169.
method. Quite si.pxy, the method of HegeLs speculative
idealism mirrors the ari-ii;:^i o^^^ tua ctual social processes of
capitalism.
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A Critique of H^H^>-mri^
Let us now turn to an evaluation of Habermas- claims
regarding Marx's concept of labor. His central claim is
that social labor is instrumental behavior imposed by the
necessity of transforming nature into use values. m
light of the foregoing analysis and reconstruction of
Marx's concept of labor Habermas ' claim must be qualified
by making it historically contingent. On the theoretical
level, Marx's concept of labor has diverse meanings and
theoretical 'functions.' On the broadest level labor
refers to the constituting activity of subjects: labor
creates social and cultural life in all its forms be they
economic, familial, language and consciousness or cultural
forms of expression. On this level it is a broad concept
with numerous diverse meanings and is best understood as
that which constitutes or creates the whole diverse range
of human forms of expression.
That Habermas' claim must be made historically
contingent means simply that the forms of expression of
labor are social ana historical. Specifically, when la^
xs subsuxne. by capital there is a tendency for all of its
forms of expression to become instrumental.
While Marx is not completely clear on the following
point one may extrapolate from his speculative comments on
the system of automated machinery and its implications for
labor that labor need not inevitably be instrumental.
Labor expended for the production of wealth in a
socialized mode of automated production would not be
defined by the technical requirements of the production
process or by the economic imperatives of capital.
Labor, rather than being defined by the production
process, would instead define production, while there may
always be a realm of necessary labor, that labor need not
always be the burdensome brute activity of subjects
strictly determined by profit and technique (division of
labor). In other words, even necessary labor need not
always be abstract, instrumental labor. But whether this
admittedly speculative interpretation can be sustained is
of little consequence. Marx clearly places human labor as
instrumental activity in the historical dimension, not in
the metatheoretical dimension.
I suggest that one possible explanation of Habermas'
analysis is that he has confused or conflated the
theoretical and historical levels of an.i. • •x i alysis in Marx. in
Ha.er.as. analysis la.or always is solely instrumental-
the realm instrumental activity has the force of ontology
behind it. in Marx, however, instrumental activity has
the force of history behind it: the history of capitalist
social relations.
r as
Habermas claims that Marx's understanding of labo
instrumental necessarily entails an instrumental
epistemology is thus also open to question. Habermas-
Observation that Marx held instrumental knowledge to be
materialized in the instruments of production is a valid
though partial statement of Marx's theory of knowledge.
Marx was certainly concerned with explaining the
relationship between objectifying, instrumental knowledge
and economic production. Clearly capital, concerned with
extracting surplus value and, formally and "really"
subsumes labor and establishes a systematic instrumental
and pragmatic relation between natural science and
production, i.e., between subject and object and social
consciousness and social being. But, as I have argued
above, capital is a social and historical relation. The
fundamental point of Marx's analysis of the fetishism of
commodities is that the objects of labor cease being under
the control of the producer and become an independent
force that dominates the producer. In the language of
Haberraas. mentor, .ao.no, -The self-„ade thing becomes a
thing-in-itself, fro. which the self cannot escape
anymore......"
forra is a ..ysterious thing, because exchange value, which
rsally the expression of a syste. of social relations
aEEears to be a natural property of the commodity
.
"Exchange value is not caused^ a system of social
relationships, or traceable to a system of social
relationships, or exElainable in terms of a system of
social relationships; exchange value is a system of social
relationships.
The same problem may be posed as follows: Habermas
claims what is Kantian about Marx's epistemology is
"...the invariant relation of the species to its natural
environment..." whether Kantian or not, this claim is on
one level trivially true. Human beings are natural
beings, evolved within natural processes (i.e., have a
natural history) and exist in a metabolic relationship
(1973) , p. 346.
Wolff
( ), How to read Das Kapital. Adorno makesthe exact same point when he states: "The fetish chapter's
•theological quirks of merchandise' mock the false
consciousness in which the social relation of the exchange
value IS reflected to contracting parties as a quality of
things-in-themselves; but those quirks are also as true as
the practice of bloody idolatry was once a fact. For the
constitutive forms of socialization, of which mystification
is one, maintain their absolute supremacy over mankind as
if they were divine Providence." (1973), p. 356.
w.t. nature. Mar. in.ee. trie, to capture the ai„ensions
Of this complex Of relations that Xin. the subject an.
nature in his ontology and economics. However, for
Haber.as, this ontological complex of relations is
necessarily characterise. ,in all historical epochs an.
arising out of the contingencies of the natural evolution
Of the species, by a behavioral system of instrumental
actron. Human beings must interact with nature an. have
acquired technical, instrumental knowledge about nature.
But the critical point is that these rules "take on
sensuous existence and belong to the historically
alterable inventory of societies.""' it is precisely the
historical dimension that Habermas' formulation slights
and conversely, that Marx's captures, it is a question of
Whether, and how, objectified technical rules (science)
have come to dominate the labor process to the exclusion
of other rules and transformed labor into instrumental
action. Marx assumes that undistorted, that is
scientific, knowledge of social relations is possible and
that the conscious subject can transcend both the
instrumental social relations and ideological fetters
imposed on consciousness by an alienated mode of
production. Knowledge, then, is not restricte. to purely
instrumental modes of apprehending the world.
(1971), p. 35.
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rn Chapter I, i noted that Haberraas appears to
identify the ter.s labor, production and „or.. and that
this identification raised so^e interesting question and
proMe.s. whiie .any co«entators have discussed problems
with Haber^as. use of the categories of labor and
interaction, few have done so with the clarity of
Giddens.'- ;,s he argues, Haber»as presents the two
categories as referring to different types of actions.
Labor refers to instrumental action, or purposeful-
rational, and interaction refers to co^unicative
interaction. But Giddens contends that neither is a
•type- of action. Rather they are analytical, "or
idealized features of action, like Weber's categories fro™
which in some part they draw their inspiration.""'
The problem, as Giddens see it, and I believe he sees
it correctly, is that it is problematic to use an
analytical element or category as equivalent to, as
IOC —
,
tor a somewhat more sympathetic discussion of this
p. 389-92, who raises the objection that since labor isalways in and through society it is more adequately seen asa subcategory of social interaction. As Held states i?-f does understand the unfolding of human powersand needs in history in relation to labour, this does notentail the collapse of interaction into a narrowinstrumentalist framework. The referent of labour is always
a form of social activity."
1 83 Thompson and Held (1982), p. 156.
Giddens states it a "c=n^^«,^ uI , substantive type" of action. '« „arx
dxd not employ Xabor as a type, ideal or otherwise, while
Weber clearly intended his categories to be Just that:
types. There is, in eff^^r^-h ^
.
m fect, a conceptual sloppiness here
that Giddens believes "IpaHo -i-^le ds to quite serious conceptual
consequences for Habern^as • work as a whole." The
identification by Haber.as of labor, production, wor. and
instrumental action do not serve his project well.
Giddens suggests that this terminological confusion
could be eliminated by defining labor as "the socially
productive activities whereby human beings interact
creatively with material nature. "^«^ Praxis should be
reserved for a broader meaning associated with the
philosophical tradition of vico, for example, as the
constituting activity of social life. This is a useful
suggestion, and one I am sympathetic towards although I
think it unnecessary. if one accepts the bi-level theory
of the structure of Marx's thought elaborated in this
work, this particular conceptual problem would be solved
by clearly keeping in mind on what level, metatheoretical
or historical, the discussion of labor is taking place,
i.e., is one discussing labor as socially constitutive




action in general, or as subsumed by the capitalist
production process.
Habe^as has responded in part to the critiois^s that
labor, or praxis, ^st be retained by social theory as a
•Philosophic, concept. He argues that the problen, lies in
trying to expand the economic concept a in philosophically
meaningful way. Haber.as argues that "...we need an
analytic clarification of the question as to whether the
economic concept of labour can really be expanded into the
concept Of a simultaneously creative and self- formative
productivity. "^^^
Marx certainly did not see himself as expanding a
narrow instrumental concept of labor into a philosophical
concept capable of supporting the theoretical edifice of a
dialectic of labor and critical-revolutionary action.
Rather, he came from a philosophic tradition, of which he
was very well aware, that put the philosophic concept at
its center. For example: Marx viewed Hegel's advance as
in seeing the movement of history as the dialectic of
labor, his failure was in seeing only mental labor. He
also saw himself in the tradition of Vico. Avineri
correctly notes that: "Marx does not consider himself the
"A Reply to my Critics" Thompson and Held, (1982)
p . 2 2 5 .
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first to have suggested that ™an creates himself by his
own wor.. Some of his re.ar.s attest to his indebtedness
to Gia»battista vico, and in one case he refers to vico in
connection with the development of technology ... From
letters to Lassalle and Engels „e know that Marx had been
reading vico in 1862 while preparing the final draft of
eaMtal. in this light, it may be more appropriate to ask
if the -philosophical, concept of labor can be specified
more precisely so as to account for specific social and
historical forms of labor. As I see it, this was Marx's
approach: to analytically clarify the philosophical, or
metatheoretical, meanings of labor and develop a
historical and social theory of the forms of expression of
actual human labor.
Habermas' criticism that Marx fails to adequately
account for self-reflection is substantially correct. A
systematic theory of knowledge is not systematically
elaborated and nowhere does Marx explain or elaborate a
process through which subjects can come to transcend the
ideological distortions imposed by the material relations
of capitalist production. In other words, what brings
about the conditions sufficient for subjects to critically
question existing social relations and their
(1968), p. 77.
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understandings of the sa^eT In this author's view it
seeras li.ely that Marx assumed that the disjuncture or
non-identity between reality and consciousness
(self-understandings) provided i-v.^ iny ; the "leverage" for critique
and self-reflection.
Whether one examines Marx's early critique of Hegel's
S^milo^pphie or his later critique of bourgeois
political economy, one will find that it is a two-pronged
attack. First, criticism is directed against the existing
state Of affairs (whether state or economy) and second,
against the most sophisticated self- understandings and
theoretical presentations (whether it be Hegel or
Ricardo)
.
The actual working of a capitalist economy can
provide the needed leverage against the theory as well as
the theory providing leverage against the reality. To the
extent that theory and reality are not identical, that
there are non-identities and contradictions, the
possibilities for critique exist. Furthermore one may
assume, as Marx apparently did, that the privations
exacted by capitalist production will impel the subject to
question a previously unquestioned, natural understanding
of society. in other words, the cunning of history,
materialistically understood as the unintended
consequences of an uncontrolled system of
150
production, will somehow engender the conditions for
enlightenment. while these arguments are insightful and
suggestive, they are not sufficient to account for
critical self-reflection. They rely too much on hopeful
assumptions. it is for this reason that neo-Marxists from
Lukacs to Habermas have wrestled with the problem of the
subjective basis for revolution.
Habermas' additional claim that Marx's epistemology
lapses into positivism on account of this failure to
account for self-reflection is specious and anachronistic.
As I have argued above, Marx does not misunderstand his
theoretical efforts and see his critique of political
economy as a branch of the natural sciences. First, what
Marx meant by science is something altogether different
from the meanings attributed to him by subsequent
interpreters. Science meant, as I have argued, the
investigation of the social practices (the realm of
becoming) that constitute the fixed forms of objectivity.
Second, Marx's critique of political economy is in large
part a critique of its positivist orientation. In sum,
one of the fundamental mystifications of political economy
is the perception of historically transient productive and
social relations as being timeless, eternal and
supra-historical. The "laws" discovered by political
economy were revealed by Marx to be (to use terminology
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Marx did not) scientistic misunderstandings in as .uch as
the laws Of political economy are a social product
misconceived as natural. This is precisely Marx's point
in criticizing a leading positivist of his day: "Hence
Auguste Comte and his school might just as well have shown
that feudal lords are an eternal necessity, in the same
way as they have done in the case of the lords of
capital . "^^^
Let us note here that Habermas • s attribution to Marx
of an intention to uncover the laws of motion of
capitalist society as natural laws is an interpretation
emphatically rejected by his mentor, Adorno. citing the
same quote as Habermas but to prove the opposite point,
Adorno argues that:
The youthful Marx expressed the unending entwinement
of the two elements [nature and history] with an
extremist vigor bound to irritate dogmatic
materialists. "We know only a single science, the
science of history. History can be considered from
two sides... Yet there is no separating the two sides;
as long as men exist, natural and human history will
qualify each other. "^^'
Adorno understood the irony in the construct 'natural
history.
' it is the uncontrolled social product that
brings to history the force of nature. The 'natural laws'
(1977) , p. 451.
Adorno (1973) , p. 358.
operative in a historical epoch acquire the status of a
dominating force "because of its [their] inevitable
Character under the prevailing conditions of
production.""" History appears natural to subjects
because it is "neither seated in their consciousness nor
subsumed under the. as a whole." There is no mistaking
Adorno's position when he states:
Habermas seems to take Marx -a la lettre. • what for
Adorno is an unending entwinement of nature and history is
for Habermas the reduction of the latter to the former.
Perhaps the cure for those who read Marx's use of the
phrase -laws of nature- is to put quotes around it so as
to emphasize the ironic nature of the construction when
applied to society. This may serve as a reminder that the
'laws' of social development appear as natural and act as
if they were natural (from the perspective of the subject)
but are the creation of a subject who is not the conscious







If Haberxnas had wanted to conclusively argue the case
for Marx.s positivism he could have employed the criteria
derived from his analysis of Comte-s positivism. m other
words, he could have argued that Marx's categorical
structure could be subsumed by a definition of positivism
in this analysis, Habermas distills the concept .positive-
into five possible meanings: sense certainty,
methodological certainty, the deduction of law-like
hypotheses, technical utilization of knowledge, and the
relativity and unfinished state of knowledge J'^
But again, Marx's approach simply cannot be fit into
the mold. For example, the methodological requirement of
the deduction of law-like hypotheses necessitates that
specific cases be subsumed under general laws. if Marx
had been a positivist in this sense, he would not have
needed the historical level of concepts. Rather, the
metatheoretical level would have been justified as a
statement of the laws of nature and historical specifics
would fall under the general laws.
Finally, it is inappropriate to attribute to Marx the
crimes of his adherents. Habermas is wrong in seeing
existing socialist societies as the logical working out of
see (1971), p. 74-77.
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tendencies in Marx's theory. This is a peculiarly
idealist construction of history given Habern^as •
self-understanding as a materialist. if Haber.as • object
Of analysis is Marxism, in the sense of a legitimating
ideology as developed and understood in specific Socialist
societies, then his assertion of its positivistic and
instrumental qualities can scarcely be questioned. if it
is Marx, then I believe he is wrong. A technological
civilization, a society of "social engineers and
inmates", a danger faced by any bureaucratized society
Whether socialist or not, is no more compatible with the
logical workings out of Marx's theory than is the
continued existence of a society of capitalists and
workers whose value lies in their status as brute objects
and instruments in the production process. The idea of
human beings as instruments of either social engineers or
capitalists is flatly incompatible with the moral vision
in Marx. The Stalinist purges are no more the working out
of Marx's theory than psychological torture and
brainwashing are the working out of the theory of defense
mechanisms in Freud's ego-psychology.
The object of Habermas ' critique is both Marx and
Marxism and his analysis is weakened by a failure to
adequately distinguish between them. Agnes Heller has
raised a similar question and asserts that Habermas'
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"•••Marx is the institutionalised one: Marxism,
historical .aterialis.... Marx that Habermas critiques
IS the Marx of Marxist ideology, or as Heller nicely puts
It, "He reinterprets the Marx who was already interpreted
by Marxism. . ."^93 if this ic, t v. i •rn IS, as I believe, the case, then
Habermas. critique is not properly speaking a critique of
Marx. Rather it is a critique of Marxism with recourse to
Marx. While the apparent object of critique is Marx, the
real object is many times removed in space, time, culture
and theoretical intention. The intent of Habermas-
construction of the ideal speech situation is oddly
betrayed by his failure to distinguish between Marx and
Marxism. Rather than freeing scholarly debate from
ideological distortion, ideology is smuggled into his
analysis of Marx and epistemological issues.
In order to conceptually link Marx and Marxism one
must assume an identity, both theoretical and practical,
between, for example, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.
There is, indeed, a tendency among a broad spectrum of
political and social theorists to do precisely that.
Individual writers, depending on their particular focus
and specific axes to grind, may eliminate or add one or
another terms to the equation. In general, orthodox
Thompson and Held (1982), p. 22.
Marxists Wish to affi™ the equation in or.er to point to
a continuous theoretical heritage which can sustain
legitimations of the evic-i-Tr,.. +. ^^n xisting state of affairs in
socialist countrif^c; t av.^ -,untries. Liberals and conservatives point to
the same equation as proof that Marxism leads to
Stalinism. Both positions are fundamentally ideological
and rigorous analysis of Marx's own texts will not sustain
the equation. For example, take the first pair of terms:
Marx/Engels. While close friends and collaborators, Marx
and Engels held to significantly different views on the
following three topics: human nature, value theory, and
the dialectic.
Terrance Bell, for instance, has argued that Marx
held to what he calls a radical humanist view of human
nature while Engels held a naturalistic, positivistic
194View. Marx held that the theory of value is
historically specific to the capitalist mode of
production. Engels held that it is trans-historical in
its explanatory power. A powerful and compelling analysis
by John Weeks demonstrates the range of issues that this
difference bears upon, including the question of the
transition from feudalism to capitalism. The question of
(1979) , p. 2.
(1981), p. 3-62
a dialectic of nature has a long history beginning with
Lukacs and Korch's work in the l920.s and .ore recently
with Alfred SchxnidtJ- The compelling evidence is that
Marx.s dialectic is socio-natural
, subject-object, while
Engels- dialectic is an ontological verity.
The NormativP Fnnnd.ations of rr-ii-^^.i r.v,_^„
The major implication of Habermas- critique is that
Marx's work does not provide an adequate normative basis
for critique. Habermas argues that: "From the beginning
there was a lack of clarity concerning the normative
foundation of Marxian social theory. "^'^ Marx could carry
out his critique on the basis of an immanent critique of
political economy, i.e., through and within the
understandings of his time. in other words, in the
mid-nineteenth century, bourgeois theory was far from
having lost all normative content. Rather justifications
of capitalism (in political economy) and the state
(natural law theories) depended on the explicit claim that
one or the other, or both, were the only forms of social
196
197
see appendix to Schmidt (1981).
(1979), p. 96.
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organization capable of fostering the realization of the
nor^s Of freedom, equality, liberty, and individuality.
Since this was the case, there was a cultural context to
which Marx need only implicitly appeal.
But that this is no longer the case follows from the
fact that "bourgeois consciousness has become
cynical... "^98 m this century, social theory "...has
been thoroughly emptied of binding normative contents . "^'^
Bourgeois ideals no longer rest on a widely held
intersubjective consensus but rather tend to be ritually
and cynically used to legitimate political action and have
been virtually completely excluded from the social
sciences in the name of positivism. This produces the
dilemma that one can not any longer employ
the method of immanent critique with any effect if the
theory one wishes to critique appears to restrict itself
to the purely descriptive and empirical.
The resolution of this dilemma lies at the heart of
Habermas' theoretical project. The question becomes:
given the dissolution of the background consensus that
once was supportive of bourgeois norms, how is it possible
198
(1979) , p. 96.
199
(1979) , p. 97
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to "reconstruct (the) general presuppositions of
communication and procedures for justifying norms and
values? "200 This is the problem the construct of the ideal
speech situation seeks to address and to which I shall
turn shortly.
As noted above, one argument Habermas employs is to
say that the problem of a normative basis for Marxian
theory is essentially a historical result of the
dissolution of bourgeois norms. But Habermas advances
another argument: the problem is inherent in Marx's
theory. If, as Habermas claims, Marx reduces knowledge to
the technical and instrumental, then instrumental reason
is the only normative basis available to Marx and Marxist
criticism. But, as I have shown, this claim is true only
in the restricted sense that Marx values objectified
instrumental knowledge in that it allows for, or may be
useful in enabling, a reduction in necessary labor time.
While in capitalist relations this results in greater
surplus value for the capitalist, under socialized
production it has the potential benefit of freeing the
subject from necessary labor. That capitalism fosters
this development is of considerable benefit to emancipated
labor since the other side of this development is the real
(1979) , p. 97
.
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potential of greater free ti.e for all-sided human
development. Through the mediation of social relations,
instrumental knowledge can have a normative dimension: a
normative imperative and a potential for liberation that
may or may not be realized in historical practice,
specifically, therefor, the distinction between necessary
and surplus labor is not simply a technical and economic
term. it has profound critical and normative
implications.
As noted earlier the implications of the argument
that Marx either lacks a normative grounding of critique
or that grounding is restricted to capitalist norms of
productivity and calculable efficiency are quite serious.
For if Marxian theory is morally and ethically bankrupt it
inevitable leads to treating persons as things and issues
in a social theory of control, manipulation and policy of
social engineering. Clearly, also, this problem is not
the exclusive domain of varieties of Marxism. To be
accurate, it is a function of all social and political
theories positivistically and scientistically oriented
in their methods and perspectives. To the extent that
historical Marxism has taken on a positivist orientation -
and this is especially relevant in countries where Marxism
is a legitimating ideology - it is susceptible to this
line of criticism.
161
Habermas argues that the critical theory of Adorno
Horkheimer and Marcuse had not yet adequately formulated
the normative and ethical foundations adequate to sustain
their critique. To phrase it as a question: to what
concepts of truth, freedom, justice can critical theory
appeal in its critique of capitalism and its justification
of a more just and rational society that are not
ideological and particularistic in their scope? Or to put
it another way, can a critical theory and its normative
foundations be secure from the very charge of ideology it
brings against other theories. As McCarthy states it:
"How does the conception of freedom on which it relies
insure that critical theory too is not just another
time-bound (say post-Enlightenment), culture based (say
secularized bourgeois) and perhaps even "class"-bound (say
alienated intellectual) standpoint? "^^^ The perceived
failure of Marx, as well as Horkheimer, Adorno, and
Marcuse, to settle this question is perhaps the central
motivation in Habermas • work. His critique of Marx,
analysis of Hegel's -Jena system,' and productive journey
into linguistics have issued in his theory of
systematically distorted communication, knowledge
constitutive interests and ideal speech situation.
see McCarthy's introduction to Legitimation Crisis
(1975) , p. xi-xii
.
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Habermas stated the core claim of this theoretical project
in his 1965 Frankfurt University inaugural lecture:
firsr:^;t:nc/"'^°"^'^'''^^ posited for us^^'oir
of unive?sa?^nH''^''^^^^S
unequivocally the intentionO r l and unconstrained consensus. Taken
on?v ?de; ^h^r^""^
^""^ responsibility constitute the
r possess a priori in the sense ofthe philosophical tradition. Perhaps that is why thelanguage of German Idealism, according to whichreason" contains both will and consciousness as itselements is not quite obsolete . "^^^
Hence, Habermas
• theory of communicative competence
is designed to meet the need for a normative foundation
for social theory. Drawing on Wittgenstein, Habermas
argues that the concept of language implies the concept of
reaching an understanding. This can be stated even more
strongly: reaching an understanding is internal to the
concept of language. The process of communication through
language would indeed be meaningless if the intention of
reaching an understanding, or consensus, were absent. But
just as clearly not all communication results in a true
consensus: all sorts of ^ empirical • factors may intervene
to prevent it, i.e., relations of force, conscious
deception, and unconscious self-deception. Yet, reaching
an understanding or a true consensus, is a concept which
(1973) , p. 314.
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all speakers of a "natural language intuitively know,
therefore it is a priori or innate. "^^^
A functioning language game presupposes four claims
that all speakers implicitly understand: "the
comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its
prepositional content, the appropriateness of its
performatory component, and the authenticity of the
speaking subject. "^^^ In normal social praxis these claims
are "naively" accepted and discourse proceeds on the
basis of a tacitly held intersubjective background
consensus. In such a situation, the above claims are
taken for granted. If, however, this intersubjective
background consensus is broken or challenged, the presumed
rationality, truth, morality, and authenticity of a
statement becomes an object of discourse. If this does
happen, then these questions can be rendered subject to
resolution only if the persons engaged in discourse
suspend all "motives except that of a willingness to come
to an understanding..." This involves, as McCarthy
elaborates, a willingness to suspend judgement as to the
"existence of certain states of affairs (that may or may
203
(1973) , p. 17
.
204
(1973) , p. 18.
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not exist) and as to the Tightness of certain norms (that
may or may not be correct .)
The centrality of language lies in its relating of
three domains: external nature, the social world and the
subjective world of the speaker. Additionally it is
through language that a subject comes to demarcate these
domains. in other words, through language the subject
differentiates himself from an external nature "that he
objectifies on the third-person attitude of an observer,"
from a social environment "that he conforms to or deviates
from", and from his own subjective consciousness and
experiences to which the subject has privileged access.
For our purposes what is important in this analysis
are the norms or validity claims that are embedded in
communication and made explicit in the ideal speech
situation. In ordinary communication, statements about
external nature carry the implicit claim to be true,
statements pertaining to interaction presuppose a claim to
"Tightness", and the claim to authenticity inheres in
statements regarding the subject's inner nature. Further,
in discourse there must be a just distribution of chances




to speak and the freedom to advance propositions and to
challenge and critique claims regarding the above domains.
As Habermas puts it:
We can examine every utterance to see whether it is
^^stified or unjustified, truthful oruntruthful, because in speech, grammatical sentencesare embedded in relations to reality in such a waythat in an acceptable speech action segments of
external nature, society, and internal nature alwayscome into appearance together
.
These, in sum, are norms derived from, or embedded in,
ordinary language, made explicit in the ideal speech
situation construct and with which Habermas hopes to
provide the foundation for critical theory.
My analysis of Marx's concept of labor and the
critique of Habermas presented above suggests that the
question of whether or not Marx holds to norms other than
instrumental rationality is an open question. I have
demonstrated that for Marx labor is not solely
instrumental behavior. If it were then all aspects of
human activity could be judged only by criteria of
technical efficiency and questions of social freedom and
the form of a just society would be susceptible only to
technical answers. Justice and human freedom would then
be nothing but a technical, bureaucratic problem and the
(1979) , p. 67-8.
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construction of a socialist society would become the
domain of social engineers.
While a full scale analysis of the normative aspect
of Marx's work is beyond the scope of this work, I will
argue, in conclusion, that strong evidence exists for the
claim that Marx indeed held to norms that provide leverage
for his critique of capitalism. These norms are: freedom,
equality, consciousness, sociality and individuality. i
shall further demonstrate that Marx was conscious of the
fact that his method distinguished his work from the other
political economists (particularly Proudhon)
.
The Normative Dimension in Marx
In the period of 1843-1844, Marx's work reveals
certain clear intentions: a critique of the state and
money. Marx viewed the critique of religion as being, in
the main, complete. His critique of capitalism and
political economy is, I shall argue, informed by and grows




man is th^^ ^ religion ends in the doctrine that
?h2 i!^^^
supreme being for man; thus it ends witht e categorical imperative to overthrow allconditions m which man is a debased, enslavedneglected, contemptible being. . .^os "^-^a a.
In this context it is clear why Marx turned from
philosophy to social theory. The compelling question for
Marx became the analysis of those conditions other than
religion that oppress humanity e.g. the state and the
economy. if the Enlightenment project of demystification
was to be completed, critical analysis of these forms of
social domination would have to be developed.
Most important from the standpoint of a critique of
Habermas is the normative dimension of Marx's early works,
which is indeed the dominant dimension. Works such as
"Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Law" are an internal critique of the existing German state
and Hegel's philosophical legitimation of that state. But
Marx is, at the same time, turning the critical method he
had developed out of his confrontation with Hegel and the
Young Hegelians to a critique of political economy,
specifically James Mill. Marx had not yet developed an
internal critique of political economy. Thus, to critique
(1975) , p. 182.
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Mill, Marx's weapons are philosophy, moralistic polemic
and outrage expressed in a tone very similar to Engel's
contemporaneous work Outlines of a Critir^n. ^-MM^VL
lconomy.^°^ The central question for understanding Marx,
and evaluating Habermas
• interpretation, is to determine
whether this philosophical-ethical dimension of Marx's
critique (and the norms underlying it) remain a part of
Marx's later works which differ otherwise in the respect
that they are a fully developed internal critique of
political economy.
Marx's "Comments on James Mill, 'Elemens d' economie
politique'" exemplify his strategy of employing a
philosophical-ethical critique against political economy.
For example, in discussing Mill on money as a medium of
exchange, Marx has nothing to say about money that we
would normally construe as an economic statement or
critique. Instead Marx employs the Hegelian terminology
of mediation and alienation to demonstrate that human
social activity becomes "A material thing outside man".^^^
In these passages Marx is concerned to point out that in a
system of exchange things no longer have significance
209 Marx, Engels (1975), p. 418-443. see also Rubel
(1981)
(1975) , p. 212.
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because of a relationship to a subject but instead gain
significance as expressions of monetary value.
Money represents an alien force which appears as a
"product and yet as the non-product" of man finally
debasing and dehumanizing man by commodifying his social,
moral and psychological existence . m a system of
credit, the moral quality that makes a person "good" is
nothing more than the ability to repay. As Marx puts it:
Credit is the economic judgment on the morality ofman. . .Within the credit relationship, it is not thecase that money is transcended in man, but that manhimself IS turned into money. . .Human individuality
human morality itself, has become both an object ofcommerce and the material in which money exists."
Marx argues that such a result demonstrates "the extent to
which all progress and all inconsistencies in a false
system are extreme retrogression and the extreme
consequence of vileness . "^^^
Marx goes on to look closely at the exchange system.
For exchange to occur, one must produce a surplus beyond
by comparison see Capital (1977), p. 47-167. There
money is analyzed as a medium of exchange, store of value,
means of payment, measure of value and relative prices, and
unit of account, or general equivalent.
(1975) , p. 214.
(1975) , p. 215.
(1975) , p. 215.
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one's immediate need. But this does not mean one rises
"above selfish need." This production for exchange is
not "social" production for it does not go beyond every
producer producing for himself. "Each of us sees in his
product only the objectification of his own selfish need,
and therefore in the product of the other the
objectification of a different selfish need, independent
of him and alien to him."^^^ The purchaser of a product
has a need or desire for the object which Marx argues,
puts the purchaser in a position of dependence on the
product.
Of course, the producer of a surplus for exchange
calculates production on the basis of the purchaser's
need. In fact, the production of a surplus is only an
"appearance," a "semblance." The reality is that the
producer produces for an exchange which he has
conceptualized prior to production. Producers do not
stand in any human or social relation to these objects or
other producers, since their "respective products. .. are
the means, the mediator , the instrument , the acknowledged
power of our mutual needs. "^^"^
215
(1975) , p. 225.
216
(1975) , p. 226
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Produced objects have value, significance and meaning
because they are "instruments" or "means" to the
satisfaction of the desires of both the producers and
purchasers. From the viewpoint of selfish, egoistic need
everything and everyone becomes instrumental. "For me,
you are rather the means and instrument of producing this
object that is my aim, just as conversely you stand in the
same relationship to my object. "^^^ In sum, Marx
characterizes the social relationship of production for
exchange as a relationship of master and slave, and one in
which persons become the instruments or servants of their
desire. While in Capital the language changes, the point
is still the same: exchange is unfree and unequal and does
not conform to the discourse which characterizes the
market ideology of classical political economy.
At the conclusion of the 'Comments on James Mill,'
and more completely in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 ^ Marx elaborates the normative basis
of his critique. The counter-factual assumption is "that
we had carried out production as human beings. "^^® The
distinctions are as follows: a) the object would be an
objectification of the producers "specific character" and
(1975) , p. 227.
Ibid.
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"individuality", b) an enjoyable "manifestation of (my)
life" during production, c) would be known to the producer
as an objectification of his personality and powers, d)
the producer would be conscious of having satisfied a
human need by his work, e) by creating an object that is
an expression of the producer's life and the satisfaction
of a social need the producer would realize his human
"social" or communal nature.
Whereas in political economy labor is a "means to
life," Marx presupposes that it can be a "free
manifestation of life , hence an enjoyment of life." In
political economy labor and life are no longer related
terms. If the intrinsic connection between these terms is
sundered, i.e., if labor is alienated, then it becomes
"hateful ... a torment . the semblance of an activity...
a
forced activity" necessitated by an "external fortuitous
need..."^^' By contrast Marx grounds his critique
explicitly upon a "real, conscious and true mode of
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220
(1975) , p. 217
.
173
Marx's positing of a normative basis for his critique
of Mill, a basis outside the conceptual limits of
classical political economy but counter-factually derived
from it, is the factor that he argued distinguishes his
work from Proudhon's. Marx argued that Proudhon is,
despite his critical pretensions, constrained by political
economy's presuppositions: private property and equality.
With respect to property, Marx remarks:
Proudhon's wish to abolish not having and the old way
of having is quite identical with his wish to abolish
the practically estranged relation of man to his
objective essence and the economic expression of
human self-estrangement. But since his criticism of
political economy is still captive to the premises of
political economy, the reappropriation of the
objective world itself is still conceived in the
economic form of possession .
Proudhon wishes to abolish the inequality of wealth
through the idea of "equal possession." But his analysis
remains riddled with contradictions in ways similar to the
political economists. Smith, Ricardo, and Sismondi all
attacked particular forms of private property.
Occasionally, when conscious of a contradiction in
political economy, these authors would discuss what Marx
referred to as the appearance of humanity in economic
relationships. It is crucial to note that the economists,
"as a rule... take these relations precisely in their
clearly pronounced difference from the human, in their
^ (1975b) , p. 43
.
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Strictly economic sense." The political economists remain
committed to an economic, or abstract, instrumental, view
of persons and society while Marx clearly maintains that
there is a distinction between the economic relations
understood in their estranged, inhuman form in capitalist
society and a potential "human form." Proudhon goes as
far as one can, while still trapped in the assumptions of
political economy, in exposing the disparity between the
"human semblance " of economic relations and "their inhuman
reality. "^^^
The above analysis indicates that the ethical/
normative assumptions Marx held and briefly elaborated in
the "Comments..." are central to his own understanding of
what distinguished his work from that of the political
economists of his time. In the first chapter of the
Manuscripts , "Wages of Labor", Marx is concerned to show
how the dynamics of capitalist production operate
consistently to the detriment of the worker. The
advantages that accrue to the capitalist and landlord due
to separation of capital rent and labor are "fatal for the
workers. "^^^ As capitalist production expands it reduces
the worker "spiritually and physically to the condition of
222
223
(1975b) , p. 33
.
(1975) , p. 235.
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a machine and from being a man [he] becomes an abstract
activity and a belly... "22^ The workers "abstract
activity" Marx refers to here is what he will later term
"labor power," a conceptual advance Marx viewed as one of
his major contributions to political economy.
No matter what socio-economic conditions prevail
workers suffer, despite the fact that all political
economists point out that without labor there is no
wealth, no capital. When socio-economic conditions
decline workers suffer "increasing misery," in expanding
conditions "—misery with complications, and in a fully
developed state of society—static misery. "^^5 This,
according to the logic of political economy, is the fate
of labor. It raises, for Marx, two questions:
1) What in the evolution of mankind is the meaning of
this reduction of the greater part of mankind to
abstract labor? 2) What are the mistakes committed
by the piecemeal reformers, who either want to raise
wages... or regard equality of wages (as Proudhon
does) as the goal of social revolution.
Our attention throughout this work has focused on the
first question and Marx's answer to it. The meaning of
(1975) , p. 236.???
(1975) , p. 239.
(1975) , p. 241.
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labor in classical political economy is clear to Marx:
"Labor occurs only in the form of activity as a source of
livelihood ." Labor is simply a means to life, an
instrument to be employed in order to live. Political
economy fails to consider human activity outside the realm
of production. Failing to consider other aspects of the
worker as human being, political economy "leaves such
consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to
the statistical tables, to politics and to the poor-house
227overseer." in an ironic sense, political economy's
understanding of labor as a commodity, as a thing, is
adequate to its object of study, the capitalist economy
which produces labor in this form. The crux of Marx's
critique of political economy at this stage is that it
sees labor, and the existing system reproducing labor, as
an oppressive system that produces people fit only for
restrictive, instrumental activity.
Thus far the analysis of Marx's normative dimension
reveals that in his early works the ethical question of
the reduction of labor to a means to life was the basis of
his critique of capitalism at that time he lacked a
critique of political economy that was internal to that
(1975) , p. 241.
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subject. Similarly, in his critique of Proudhon, Marx
shows he was conscious of the fact that his theory had a
dimension transcending the limits of political economy,
and the limits constraining Proudhon 's analysis. In what
follows I seek to demonstrate that this normative
dimension is carried through in Marx's later works and is
grounded in the metatheoretical level of analysis.
Marx has a normative dimension in his later works and
it is contained in his vision of labor emancipated from
the domination of capital (or the same formulation in
terms of the early Marx: non-alienated labor) . Textual
clues to these norms can be found in all of Marx's major
writings. The norms which infuse his vision of
emancipated labor I contend are "The free development of
• ' • • • 228individualities," consciousness (in terms of conscious
control of the social product) , freedom (in a substantive
rather than formal sense) and sociality.
In Capital , Marx characterizes the world of Robinson
Crusoe, Medieval Europe, and an "association of free
229 • ...men." The first two exhibit different types of modes of
domination (supremacy and subordination) . Dependency in
228
(1973) , p. 706.
229
(1977) , p. 169-72
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the feudal mode of production (and of feudal society
generally) is based on personal subordination. In
capitalism, personal dependence gives way to formal
freedom. Now free from political and religious
constraints, labor is formally and "really" subsumed under
capital (the objective factors of production become alien
property and the subject becomes an instrument) . Perhaps
nowhere else is Marx so bitterly ironic as in the famous
passage where he lays bare the norms that justify
commodity exchange, the "very Eden of the innate rights of
man." Marx continues:
It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer
and seller of a commodity, let us say of labor-power,
are determined only by their own free will. They
contract as free persons, who are equal before the
law. Their contract is the final result in which
their joint will finds a common legal expression.
Equality, because each enters into relation with the
other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and
they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property,
because each disposes only of what is his own. And
Bentham, because each looks only to his own
advantage. The only force bringing them together and
putting them into relation with each other, is the
selfishness, the gain and the private interest of
each. Each pays heed to himself only, and no one
worries about the others. And precisely for that
reason, either in accordance with the pre-established
harmony of things, or under the auspices of an
omniscient providence, they all work together to
their mutual advantage, for the commonweal, and in
the common interest."
(1977) , p. 280.
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Marx's vision of emancipated labor is presented as a
free association of producers commonly owning the means of
production. They exercise their labor under conditions
"transparent" to their consciousness."^ Under their
conscious control, the social product no longer assumes
its fantastic forms.
If the normative dimension of Marx's critique is
expressed in his vision of emancipated labor, it is
grounded in the metatheoretical level of analysis. It is
for that reason that Habermas fails to recognize it.
Marx's analysis of man in capitalism is that he is
alienated 1) from self through the sale of labor power, 2)
from the product through capitalist property relations, 3)
from nature which becomes brute objectivity that is
treated instrumentally
, 4) from others through the
impoverished social relations of utilitarian self
interest, and 5) from consciousness which must become
separate from the body and sensuousness to maintain the
fiction of freedom and allow the sale of labor power.
However, the metatheoretical level provides a realm
abstracted from these specific historical relations, a
realm in which the subject can be conceptualized in a
manner not constrained by existing social relations. That
^ (1977) , p. 172
.
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man is an active being can be seen to imply that this
activity can be a pleasure rather than a burden, a
manifestation of life rather than merely a means. That
man is an objective being implies the counter-factual
possibility that the product can truly be the
manifestation of the subject's powers and under the
control of the subject. That the subject is a natural
being implies that the subject can relate to both internal
and external nature in ways other than instrumentally
.
That man is a social being implies relations that can be
characterized as a bond or community rather than
atomistically . Marx's anthropology is fundamentally one
which stresses the potential development and realization
232of man's powers. This is, as McPherson notes, a
fundamentally ethical concept of man.
Seen from the vantage point of Marx's ontological
assumptions, being or socially produced objectivity can
take forms other than those characterized by alienation
and the commodity forms. That man must appropriate nature
In discussing power, McPherson distinguishes between
an ethical and descriptive concept. The ethical concept of
power is defined as the subject's ability "to use and
develop his essentially human capacities ... and his power
must include access to the means of using his capacities,
and that his power is diminished by lack of such access."
He develops the concept of "extractive power" to cover the
ability of one person to use another's power. (1973), p.
39-76.
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in the form of useful objects, carry on this activity with
others, does not necessitate that the social relations and
material objectivity thereby produced be a hostile and
uncontrollable power that requires the commodification of
these essential relations.
From an epistemological perspective a mentally and
physically active subject constitutes the world of objects
and social relations and the forms through which these are
known. If we may imagine that this world could be the
conscious product of the social individual then the
illusions created by an objectivity out of the subject's
control would vanish. The fetishism of the commodity,
money, the trinity formula, etc. , could be seen as what
they are: a social product. By abstracting from the
specific forms of historical social relations and by
focusing on the common, universal and necessary conditions
of social existence, Marx creates a conceptual space
suitable to the grounding of normative assumptions.
Habermas asks us to conceive of communicative
relations free of all the distortions inherent in ordinary
life: power, deception and self-deception. Marx asks us
to conceive of the relations of human activity (labor) in
a way free from historical conditions of domination:
182
exploitation, property relations, alienation. Each,
though starting from different paradigms and with
different theoretical projects, wants to abstract from
real conditions that distort those paradigms and to
construct a vision of an alternative. For Habermas,
speech acts implicitly carry with them claims to be true
or untrue, authentic or inauthentic, normative or ethical.
Tightness and equality of participation and freedom from
constraints. These claims, while they inhere in ordinary
communication, are made explicit in the ideal speech
situation construct. Similarly, Marx claims that human
labor abstracted from historical distortions can be
carried out freely and in control by conscious social
individuals. Habermas claims the centrality of language
lies in its relating the domains of external nature,
internal nature and the social world. Speech necessarily
brings these domains together. So also does labor.
Finally, Habermas' theory is animated by an
overriding interest in human autonomy and the realization
of such through a theory with a practical intent—that of
realizing a just and free society. This, too, is Marx's
interest. His analysis of capitalism reveals the extent
to which freedom and autonomy are fictions in capitalist
society.
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These powerful similarities suggest, in this writer's
opinion, that Habermas has not so much transcended the
limitations of Marx but rather tends to provide a powerful
confirmation of the intent of Marx's theoretical project.
Marx's analyses penetrate the secret language of
commodities while Habermas penetrates the presuppositions
of language. These analyses complement each other.
Both theorists try to base hope for human
emancipation on assumptions derived from aspects of human
existence. They argue that underlying labor and language
is a dimension of general, abstract, universal and
necessary assumptions: apriori assumptions. Given the
intent of their respective projects, that their thought is
animated by 'emancipatory interest' and part of a
historical tradition of critical theory, it should not be
surprising to find that the normative assumptions upon
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